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Washington’s Criminal Competency Laws: 
Getting From Where We Are 
 to Where We Should Be 
Michael J. Finkle1 
 
The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the 
sword—ultimately rests on substantial public confidence in its 
moral sanctions. 
                                           Felix Frankfurter  
 
In 1997, two high-profile Seattle cases involving mentally ill offenders 
brought to the forefront of public attention the interaction between the 
criminal justice system and the mental health system.  In one case, a 
transient, whose minor theft charge had been dismissed one month earlier 
because he was not competent to stand trial, stabbed and killed a retired 
firefighter.2  In the other, a man who had spent the previous ten years at 
Western State Hospital carried an un-sheathed Samurai sword through Pike 
Place Market.3  As a result, the King County Executive created a task force 
to recommend new legislation to prevent similar future tragedies.  In 1998, 
the Washington State Legislature, accepting the task force’s 
recommendation, enacted Second Substitute Senate Bill 6214 (the Act).  
The bill brought forth a sweeping set of changes to Washington’s criminal 
competency and civil commitment laws.4  The overwhelming majority of 
changes to the competency laws relate to nonfelonies.5 
The Act created a system of mandatory mental health treatment to restore 
“competency to stand trial” to those defendants charged with nonfelony 
crimes.  The Act also carried with it the possibility, under certain 
circumstances, of mandatory referrals to the civil mental health system.  In 
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spite of the large number of groups and individuals from the mental health 
and criminal justice systems who participated in recommending the 
legislation, there was no way to predict how the legislation would work in 
practice over the next several years.  Two relatively recent cases, Born v. 
Thompson6 and Sell v. United States,7 have added yet another layer of 
complexity to the nonfelony competency process.  Indeed, the competency 
process for nonfelonies is far more complex than the competency process 
for the most serious felonies.  Now that the criminal justice and mental 
health systems have eight years of experience with the Act, and in light of 
the ever-increasing number of nonfelony cases in which competency is at 
issue,8 the time has come to take a hard look at how to improve the 
competency process in order to ensure that it continues to serve its intended 
purpose. 
This article identifies unresolved issues in the current statutory scheme 
and the policy implications of each of the issues, including policy choices 
inherent in the range of potential “fixes.”  Where possible, it proposes 
solutions that the legislature could adopt depending upon the policy choices 
the legislature makes.  Some of the policy implications relate to society’s 
choice of referring mentally ill people who commit criminal acts, and are 
incompetent to stand trial, to either the criminal competency system or to 
the civil commitment system.9  Other policy proposals look at the tension 
between the mental health system and the legal system while focusing on 
translating mental health concepts into legal standards and determining who 
should define many of the legal terms.  Still other policy implications relate 
to cost-sharing decisions, such as whether a city, county, or the state should 
bear the often-unrecognized costs of the criminal competency process. 
Section I of the article provides a brief summary of the current 
competency framework, from the initial competency evaluation through the 
entire process.  The next three sections explore the competency framework 
in great detail.  Section II describes the initial competency evaluation 
process and identifies policy issues implicated by that process.  Section III 
          Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 203 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
walks the reader through the complicated process by which the criminal 
justice system attempts to render incompetent defendants competent to 
proceed in the criminal case, and it discusses the impact of the Sell and 
Born cases on that process.  It also identifies inefficiencies in the system 
and explores how the competency process often overlaps with the process 
for civilly committing the mentally ill.  Section IV discusses the 
competency process in the context of post-judgment cases, and points out 
issues specific to cases at the post-judgment phase.  Finally, Section V 
proposes a series of solutions to the issues identified in the previous 
sections.  Those solutions provide a consistent competency process that 
both utilizes limited resources more effectively and complements the civil 
commitment system.  
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMPETENCY PROCESS 
A defendant is “incompetent” if he or she lacks the capacity to 
understand the nature of the proceedings, or to assist in his or her own 
defense as a result of mental disease or defect.10  By the express language 
of the statute, there must be a causal connection between the defendant’s 
mental disease or defect and the defendant’s lack of capacity. 
The competency process begins with the competency evaluation.  
Whenever there is reason to doubt a defendant’s competency to stand trial, 
the court, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, must order a 
competency evaluation.11  The evaluation may occur on an outpatient basis, 
i.e., outside of the hospital,12 or it may occur on an inpatient basis at one of 
the two state psychiatric hospitals, Western State Hospital (Western State) 
or Eastern State Hospital (Eastern State). 13  If the court commits the 
defendant to a hospital or other suitable secure public or private mental 
health facility for the competency evaluation, then the court has discretion 
to delay granting bail until after the defendant has been evaluated and 
appears before the court.14  This provision applies equally to felony and 
nonfelony defendants.  After the evaluation has been completed, the court 
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will hold a hearing at which it will make a finding that the defendant is 
either competent or incompetent.   
If the court finds that the defendant is competent, the criminal 
proceedings continue.  If the court finds that the defendant is incompetent, 
the court’s actions depend upon whether the defendant is charged with a 
felony or a nonfelony, and upon whether the case is at the pre-judgment 
phase or post-judgment phase.  If the case is at the pre-judgment phase, then 
all proceedings relating to the defendant’s competency to stand trial are 
excluded from the legally prescribed time-for-trial period, beginning on the 
date the court orders the competency evaluation.15  The time-for-trial period 
begins running again when the court enters a written order finding the 
defendant competent.16  A defendant charged with a felony must be ordered 
into competency-rendering treatment.  Whether a defendant charged with a 
nonfelony must be ordered into competency-rendering treatment, and 
whether that treatment occurs on an inpatient or outpatient basis, depends 
upon a host of factors.  If competency-rendering treatment is unsuccessful 
for a felony or nonfelony defendant, or if a nonfelony defendant is not 
eligible for competency-rendering treatment, the court must dismiss the 
matter without prejudice and either release the defendant outright or refer 
the defendant for a civil commitment evaluation.17 
II. THE INITIAL COMPETENCY EVALUATION 
As noted above, a criminal defendant is incompetent to proceed18 if, as a 
result of mental disease or defect, he or she lacks the capacity to understand 
the nature of the proceedings or to assist in his or her own defense.19  The 
defendant will be presumed competent to stand trial unless the court finds 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is incompetent to 
stand trial.  The burden to show incompetency rests with the party asserting 
it.20  This section describes in further detail the two primary components of 
the initial competency assessment: the concept of “mental disease or 
          Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 205 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
defect,” and the process by which the initial evaluation occurs.  It also 
identifies policy choices and who bears the cost of those choices. 
A.  Defining Mental Disease or Defect 
1.  No Current Statutory Definition 
Though the phrase “mental disease or defect” is of great importance in 
RCW 10.77, the legislature has left the phrase undefined.  A recent 
Washington Supreme Court decision provides some guidance, but it makes 
clear that, absent a legislative definition, “mental disease or defect” is 
judicially interpreted on a case-by-case basis, subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard on appeal.  In State v. Klein,21 the defendant challenged 
the trial court’s findings that she suffered from a mental disease or defect.  
Although Klein involved a petition for full release following an acquittal by 
reason of insanity, the insanity statute contains the same “mental disease or 
defect” terminology as the incompetency statute, and Klein’s reasoning 
should apply equally in the competency context.22 
The court held in Klein that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s 
finding that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect.23  In 
declining to create an across-the-board judicial definition of the term, the 
court explained as follows: 
Although our legislature has not further defined the term “mental 
disease or defect,” other state legislatures have.  In doing so, these 
legislatures have exercised a legislative prerogative to depart from 
a dictionary definition and have instead made policy choices to 
exclude specific types of mental conditions from the term.  Were 
we to do so here by court decision, we would unduly encroach 
upon the legislative function, especially since our legislature has 
not seen fit to further define the term.24 
After Klein, Washington trial courts must now struggle to apply a 
standard that contains both legal and mental health components.  For 
example, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
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Manual of Mental Disorders (4th rev. ed.) (DSM IV) is a widely accepted 
compilation of mental disorders and is universally relied upon in the mental 
health field.  While there might be a tendency to rely on the DSM IV to 
define a mental disease or defect in the legal context, “[n]ot all disorders 
defined therein will rise to the status of ‘disease or defect’ under our 
statutes.”25  For trial judges, the Frye test for scientific testimony,26 as well 
as the provisions of Rule 702 of the Washington Rules of Evidence relating 
to expert testimony, can assure that the DSM IV does not become a de facto 
definition of mental disease or defect.  Indeed, the Klein court cautioned 
that trial courts should not defer to mental health professionals to define 
what are essentially legal terms.27 
2.  Policy Implications in Defining “Mental Disease or Defect” 
Considering that competency determinations begin with the threshold 
question of whether the defendant does or does not suffer from a mental 
disease or defect, the policy choice is simple: who is best suited to define 
what is or is not a mental disease or defect?  As the supreme court noted in 
Klein, the legislative branch of government has the right of first refusal—it 
can choose to adopt a statutory definition or to defer to the judicial branch 
to define the term on a case-by-case basis. 
Philosophical considerations about the division of governmental powers 
aside, a statutory definition is preferable on several levels.  First, a uniform 
definition ensures that trial judges in Puyallup and Pullman apply the same 
definition as trial judges in Seattle and Selah.  Furthermore, the legislature 
can exercise quality control in adopting a definition by obtaining input from 
mental health experts, legal experts, and the general public, and can then 
give appropriate consideration and weight to that input.  A judicial or case-
by-case interpretation, on the other hand, leaves the quality of the trial 
judge’s decision dependent upon clinical information and the quality of the 
expert opinion(s) available in a particular case. 
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B.  Determining the True Purpose of the Evaluation Process 
Legislation generally involves choosing from among several alternatives, 
each of which has an associated fiscal and/or societal cost.  In the case of 
Washington’s current competency laws, one of the crucial choices the state 
must make concerns the manner in which it responds to the continuously 
escalating amount of bed space needed for patients at both Western State 
and Eastern State.  The defendant certainly pays a liberty cost when his or 
her freedom is curtailed so that the hospital can conduct a competency 
evaluation.  The longer it takes for the evaluation, the greater the 
defendant’s freedom is curtailed.  Society also pays an escalating cost based 
upon the length of time it takes for the evaluation to occur.28  The former 
cost is of great consequence to specific individuals, while the latter is of 
great consequence to the public at large. 
For defendants who are in custody at the time the court orders a 
competency evaluation, the court may order that the examination occur 
inpatient at a mental health facility or, with the agreement of the parties, in 
jail.29  The relevant statutory language is: 
For purposes of the examination, the court may order the defendant 
committed to a hospital or other suitably secure public or private 
mental health facility for a period of time necessary to complete 
the examination, but not to exceed fifteen days from the time of 
admission to the facility.  If the defendant is being held in jail or 
other detention facility, upon agreement of the parties, the court 
may direct that the examination be conducted at the jail or other 
detention facility.30 
The statute is subject to interpretation regarding whether there is a time 
limit within which an in-jail evaluation must occur.31  The legislature should 
clear up this ambiguity when it amends other provisions of the competency 
statutes. 
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1.  A System Ready to Collapse From its Own Weight 
While the competency evaluation process currently in place may have 
been sufficient to handle the caseload of ten years ago, it is most certainly 
overwhelmed by today’s caseload.  Statistics provided by the Department of 
Social and Health Services (DSHS) to the legislature in June 2006 show a 
“steep and steady rise” in the number of competency evaluations conducted 
over the past ten years.32  In 1995, Western State and Eastern State 
conducted a combined total of 665 competency evaluations, 21 percent 
(140) of which were for nonfelony cases.  By 2005, the number of 
evaluations had tripled to 1,995, and the percentage pertaining to nonfelony 
cases had nearly doubled to 40 percent (802).  Astonishingly, the percentage 
of nonfelony evaluations by Eastern State actually decreased from 26 
percent to 25 percent, while the percentage of nonfelony evaluations at 
Western State tripled from 19 percent to 56 percent.33  Statistics available 
for Western State show that the percentage of outpatient evaluations 
increased by orders of magnitude over that same ten year period—from 4.3 
percent in 1995 to 82 percent in 2005.34  The overwhelming majority of 
outpatient evaluations occur in jail.35  Consequently, the average outpatient 
evaluation by Western State currently takes twenty-one days to complete 
for in-jail nonfelony defendants, thirty to sixty days for in-jail felony 
defendants, and four months for out-of-custody evaluations.36  Although 
inpatient evaluations must occur within fifteen days of the defendant’s 
admission to the hospital, 37 defendants spend an average of forty to sixty 
days in jail waiting to be admitted to Western State. 38  
The lengthy wait for evaluations is most likely attributable to three 
factors: (1) staffing levels at Western and Eastern State; (2) limited bed 
space in the hospitals themselves; and (3) at least for Western State, the 
terms of a federal court order limiting admissions to the hospital based on 
several factors including available bed space.39  First, while Western State’s 
staffing levels have increased, which helps ease the strain on conducting 
outpatient evaluations without increasing the hospital’s physical plant, there 
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are limits to the number of qualified competency evaluators that the hospital 
can train and for whom it can provide office space.  Secondly, concerning 
bed space, the hospital serves the needs of many other mentally ill people, 
including those who are undergoing competency-rendering treatment, 
treatment pursuant to an acquittal by reason of insanity, or treatment 
pursuant to civil commitment.40  Finally, unless the state increases Western 
State’s physical campus, it cannot increase available bed space for inpatient 
evaluations without also decreasing available bed space for other purposes. 
2.  Determining and Allocating the Cost 
The state bears the monetary cost of the evaluation and, if the defendant 
is evaluated on an inpatient basis, the costs of the defendant’s hospital stay 
during the course of the evaluation.  Cities and counties bear the monetary 
cost for the amount of time the defendant spends in jail—either awaiting 
transport to the hospital for an inpatient evaluation or for an outpatient 
evaluation to occur in the jail.41  As the length of time a defendant spends in 
jail for competency evaluation purposes increases, so does the cost to cities 
and counties.  If jail costs have increased because of staffing or capacity 
issues at the two state-run psychiatric hospitals, then the state has 
essentially shifted a large portion of the cost of competency evaluations to 
local jurisdictions.  Those jurisdictions then have less money to spend on 
social services for all of their citizens, some of whom are mentally ill.  As 
social services for the mentally ill decrease, the number of mentally ill 
people who commit acts that result in criminal charges presumably 
increases.  That, in turn, leads to further increases in competency 
evaluations, and the vicious cycle renews itself. 
By the same token, using state funds to increase capacity at Western State 
and Eastern State reduces the amount of funding available for other social 
services, including social services designated for the mentally ill.  The less 
the state spends on social services, the more likely those who would 
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otherwise benefit from these social services will either go without or have 
to depend on local jurisdictions for support. 
III. THE COMPETENCY-RENDERING PROCESS 
The logical next step, if the court finds the defendant incompetent to 
stand trial, is to try to restore the defendant’s competency.  The current 
statutory process requires far more resources than necessary—to the point 
where the nonfelony process far exceeds the felony process in its 
complexity.  This section describes the current competency-rendering 
process42 for defendants charged with felonies and for those charged with 
nonfelonies,43 identifying aspects of each of those processes that are either 
difficult to apply, inefficient, or both.  It also examines the concept of 
involuntary medication to render a defendant competent, and the interaction 
between the competency-rendering process and involuntary medication. 
A.  The Felony Process 
If the court finds a felony defendant incompetent to stand trial, the 
process is relatively straightforward:  the court must commit the defendant 
to DSHS for up to ninety days of competency-rendering treatment.44  If the 
defendant remains incompetent at the end of ninety days, the court has the 
discretion to order an additional ninety days of treatment.45  If the defendant 
still remains incompetent at the end of the second ninety-day period, and if 
certain conditions are met, the court may extend the treatment by up to an 
additional 180 days.46  To extend treatment, the court or jury47 must find 
that the defendant is a substantial danger to other persons or presents a 
substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety 
or security48 and that there is a substantial likelihood the defendant will be 
rendered competent within a reasonable period.49 
If the defendant remains incompetent to stand trial at the end of the final 
competency-rendering period, the court must dismiss the case without 
prejudice—which allows a prosecutor to refile the case at a later time—and 
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either institute civil commitment proceedings or order the defendant’s 
release.50  Unlike the nonfelony process, in which the civil commitment 
referral procedures are clearly set forth,51 the felony process is silent on the 
referral procedures. 
B.  The Nonfelony Process 
With legislative passage of the Act in 1998, the legislature began treating 
nonfelony defendants more like felony defendants by creating a 
competency-rendering process for eligible cases.  The similarities end there; 
the nonfelony competency-rendering process is more complex than the 
felony process by orders of magnitude.  The nonfelony court must 
determine whether the defendant is treatment-eligible, and, if eligible, the 
court must decide what form the competency-rendering treatment should 
take.  As this next section graphically illustrates, what sounds like a simple 
determination actually takes up an inordinate amount of court and attorney 
resources. 
1.  Identifying Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony Defendants—“Violent 
Qualifiers” 
 Washington’s criminal competency statute, codified as RCW 
10.77.090(1)(d), is silent about the prosecution’s burden of proof, but the 
Washington State Supreme Court held in Born52 that the prosecution must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that a nonfelony defendant is 
eligible for competency-rendering treatment.  The elevated burden of proof, 
coupled with the procedural hoops set forth in the statute, leads to a large 
number of hearings just on the issue of whether a nonfelony defendant is 
treatment-eligible.  
A “treatment-eligible nonfelony defendant” is one who:  (1) has a history 
of, or a pending charge of, one or more violent acts; or (2) has previously 
been acquitted by reason of insanity, or has previously been found 
incompetent, with regard to an alleged offense involving actual, threatened, 
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or attempted physical harm to a person.53  A “violent act” is behavior that 
(1) resulted in, or if completed as intended would have resulted in, or was 
threatened to be carried out by a person who had the intent and opportunity 
to carry out the threat and would have resulted in homicide, nonfatal 
injuries, or substantial damage to property; or (2) recklessly creates an 
immediate risk of serious physical injury to another person.54  For purposes 
of defining a violent act, “nonfatal injuries” means physical pain or injury, 
illness, or an impairment of physical condition.55  A “history of one or more 
violent acts” means violent acts committed by the defendant within the ten 
years prior to the date criminal charges were filed—excluding any time 
spent in jail, prison, or a mental health facility.56 
a)  Violent Acts 
A violent act under the statute does not require a conviction; the 
definition of “violent act” refers to “behavior” rather than a conviction.  
This makes sense, especially in the context of a pending charge, which by 
definition will not involve a conviction.  Since the “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof for competency-rendering treatment eligibility is less than 
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof for a criminal 
conviction, it is possible for a court to find a violent act even if the 
defendant has been acquitted in the criminal case.  Additionally, there are 
cases in which a violent act can be established other than by a conviction or 
a pending charge.  For example, the competency evaluation report itself 
might refer to a past violent act by the defendant against staff members at 
the evaluation facility. 
b)  History of One or More Violent Acts 
The most common form of “history” of one or more violent acts in 
determining treatment-eligible or non-treatment-eligible status will be a 
prior conviction.  But how does the prosecution establish that the prior 
conviction involved a violent act? 
          Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 213 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
(1)  Statutory Presumptions 
RCW 10.77.260 established several statutory presumptions to guide the 
courts.  The presumptions are rebuttable.  First, the court must presume that 
a past conviction, whether by guilty plea or finding, establishes the elements 
necessary for the crime charged. 
Second, the court must also consider that the elements of the crime, in the 
absence of the facts of a specific case, may not be sufficient to establish that 
the defendant committed a violent act.  For example, assault can be 
committed in several ways, including an unlawful and offensive touching 
which neither caused nor threatened to cause injury.  In order to use the 
assault to find that the defendant is in the treatment-eligible category, the 
court would need to know more about the underlying facts. 
Third, the court must presume that the facts underlying the elements of 
the crime, if un-rebutted, are sufficient to establish that the defendant 
committed a violent act.  That begs this question: what constitutes rebuttal?  
Does rebuttal include a defense argument based on the very same facts 
relied upon by the prosecution?  If a defense argument does constitute 
rebuttal, the court has deference in deciding any weight given to the 
rebuttal.  The clear intent of the legislature in the 1998 amendments to 
RCW 10.77.260 was to expand on the court’s ability to receive information 
on which it can make a reasonable and intelligent finding regarding whether 
the defendant is treatment-eligible or non-treatment-eligible.  But the 
legislature also clearly intended that the court analyze the facts underlying 
the alleged violent act in making its decision.57 
(2)  Acceptable Evidence 
RCW 10.77.260(3) provides that, in determining the underlying facts, the 
court may consider information including, but not limited to, affidavits or 
declarations under penalty of perjury, criminal history record information,58 
and its own or certified copies of another court’s records.  Examples of 
court records referred to by the statute are criminal complaints, 
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certifications of probable cause to detain, dockets, and orders on judgment 
and sentencing. 
Note that the statute does not expressly include or exclude police reports.  
One could argue that the statute’s language “including, but not limited to” 
was intended by the legislature to mean that the court could choose to 
accept material that is not expressly listed in the statute, such as a police 
report.  It is left to each court, then, to interpret the meaning of the statute 
and to decide whether to accept police reports as evidence at the hearing.  In 
addition, if the police report is signed under penalty of perjury under the 
laws of the State of Washington, one could argue that the police report 
meets the statutory definition of a “declaration.”59 
There is one additional caveat.  As noted above, the supreme court held 
in Born that the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that a nonfelony defendant is eligible for competency-rendering treatment.  
There may be other issues, such as determining the appropriate level of due 
process at a competency-rendering hearing.  Depending on how much 
process is required, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. 
Washington60 may come into play.  In Crawford, the Court held that where 
those “testimonial” statements that fall within certain types of hearsay 
exceptions are at issue, the confrontation clause of the U.S. Constitution 
requires a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses.  The extent to which 
Crawford would apply, if at all, to a competency-rendering hearing 
involving RCW 10.77.260(3) is yet another issue complicating the process. 
(3)  How Provisions Apply in Practice 
Two brief examples demonstrate how the statute works in practice.  For 
each example, assume that the defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree assault 
two years ago, and that the prosecution presented a certified copy of the 
order on judgment and sentencing, as well as a certified copy of the 
certification of probable cause filed along with the original charge.  Assume 
further that there is no Crawford issue.61 
          Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 215 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
In the first example, the certification of probable cause recites that the 
defendant told the victim, “I want to break your neck,” hit the victim on the 
back of the head with a two-foot-long wooden board, and yelled, “I hope 
you feel the pain.”  This presents a clear example of a past violent act.  It is 
hard to imagine any facts in the certification of probable cause on which the 
defense could rely to rebut the presumption that the assault constituted a 
violent act.  The only way the defense could rebut the underlying facts is by 
presenting witnesses to the prior incident.62 
In the second example, the certification of probable cause recites that the 
defendant walked up to the victim and slapped him on the cheek, but that 
the victim was not injured.  In this example, the court would be required to 
presume that all of the elements of assault were established by the plea.  But 
the court would also need to consider that the plea could have been based 
on either a theory of offensive touching or a theory of attempt to injure.  
The first theory would not establish a violent act, but the second might. 
The prosecution would argue that the facts establish the violent act, since 
the defendant intentionally hit the victim.  The defense could argue that the 
facts in the certification of probable cause do not amount to a violent act, as 
defined under RCW 10.77.010(23), because they show, at most, an 
offensive touching.  Since the defense’s argument appears plausible under 
the facts of the example, the prosecution’s version of the facts would be 
rebutted.  The court would need to make a factual finding about whether the 
prior assault constituted a violent act.  In this cheek-slapping example, 
depending on any other surrounding facts in the certification of probable 
cause, the court could reasonably find for either the prosecution or the 
defense. 
There is one additional point well worth considering.  The definition of 
“violent act” also includes behavior that “recklessly creates an immediate 
risk of serious physical injury to another person.”63  If the defendant’s 
behavior in the alleged violent act was not intentional and did not result in 
actual nonfatal injuries, it may be possible to use the so-called reckless 
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prong of the definition of “violent act.”  Consider a DUI or reckless driving 
case in which the defendant’s driving was especially egregious, such as 
driving up on a sidewalk or hitting a pedestrian without causing enough 
injury to justify a felony vehicular assault charge. 
c)  Pending Charge Involving Violent Act 
The presumptions in RCW 10.77.260 do not apply to pending charges.  
For a pending charge, the simplest procedure is for the court to refer to the 
police report or certification of probable cause to see if the facts contained 
therein support a finding that the defendant belongs in the treatment-eligible 
category.  For example, the parties in Born stipulated to the police report. 
It is possible that the defense will decline to stipulate and will argue that 
due process requires that the prosecution present live testimony because the 
defendant faces possible competency-rendering treatment.  Three aspects of 
the supreme court’s holding in Born might make it difficult to convince a 
trial court otherwise.  First, the court held that the proper standard for 
determining a defendant’s eligibility for competency-rendering treatment is 
by clear and convincing evidence.  Second, the court stated that the 
prosecution had a lesser interest in prosecuting nonfelonies than felonies.64  
Third, the court relied on the due process rights in civil commitment cases, 
which require greater process.65 
A contrary prosecution argument is that by setting bail and detaining 
criminal defendants in custody pending trial, courts are permitted to rely on 
facts contained in a document sworn under penalty of perjury, such as a 
police report or the certification of probable cause.  Detaining a person on 
bail and detaining a person for competency-rendering treatment appear to 
involve the same type of liberty deprivation, so one could argue that there is 
no reason to rely on a sworn police report for one but not for the other.  
Also, there is no process provided for felony defendants; any defendant 
charged with a felony who is incompetent must be sent for up to ninety days 
of competency-rendering treatment.66  The bottom line, however, is that the 
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court must make the requisite findings, and has the authority to require live 
testimony even if the constitution does not require it.  Given the supreme 
court’s position in Born, the safer course of action, absent a stipulation, is to 
present live testimony. 
d)  Prior Incompetency Dismissals and Insanity Acquittals 
It is axiomatic that the prosecutor, in order to rely on a prior 
incompetency dismissal or insanity acquittal, must be aware that it has 
occurred.  That awareness cannot exist unless there is a record of the 
dismissal or acquittal.  The Criminal Records Privacy Act’s definition of 
“conviction or other disposition adverse to the subject” includes dismissals 
due to incompetency and acquittals by reason of insanity,67 so the dismissal 
or acquittal can be entered into a defendant’s criminal history.  
Unfortunately, many prior findings of incompetency or insanity, especially 
those from courts of limited jurisdiction, are not identifiable on criminal 
histories, so these two criteria may not be applied consistently.  In some 
cases, Eastern State or Western State may have limited data available about 
a particular defendant who is being evaluated. 
Assuming the defendant does have a prior incompetency dismissal or 
insanity acquittal, the question is how to establish that it involved a violent 
act.  The procedures in RCW 10.77.260 do not apply to prior incompetency 
dismissals; the discussion of pending charges above would presumably 
apply.  Since an insanity acquittal includes a finding that the defendant 
committed the acts charged,68 the procedures in RCW 10.77.260 for prior 
convictions presumably apply to prior insanity acquittals. 
e)  When to Make the Determination 
The issue of whether a nonfelony defendant is in the treatment-eligible or 
non-treatment-eligible category does not arise until after the court has 
determined that the defendant is incompetent.  Once the court makes that 
determination, the court will need to set another hearing date, this time to 
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handle the issue of whether the defendant is in the treatment-eligible or non-
treatment-eligible category.  Depending on the timing of the initial 
competency evaluation and the willingness of the parties to stipulate to 
some or all of the issues, the court might set a single hearing for 
competency and for treatment-eligible/non-treatment-eligible status, or a 
separate hearing for each issue. 
2.  Different Results for Treatment-Eligible and Non-Treatment-
Eligible Nonfelony Defendants 
a)  Competency-Rendering Treatment for Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony 
Defendants 
So why does it matter whether a nonfelony defendant is eligible for 
competency-rendering treatment?  A treatment-eligible nonfelony 
defendant, if found incompetent, must be placed into inpatient or outpatient 
treatment to restore competency.  The court has discretion to require 
fourteen days of inpatient treatment or to require ninety days of outpatient 
treatment by way of a conditional release, or to require a combination of the 
two.69  The treatment alternatives need not be done in any particular order, 
but as a practical matter there is no formal outpatient treatment program 
available, at least through Western State.70  There has been some 
preliminary talk about setting up an outpatient competency-rendering 
treatment program through Western State, but that has yet to happen. 
Even if outpatient competency-rendering were readily available, it might 
not make sense for the prosecutor to recommend, or for the court to order, 
that the defendant undertake such a program.  For example, the defendant 
might have a sufficiently violent proclivity (based on criminal history or the 
current charge) that he or she would be dangerous to patients and staff at an 
unsecured outpatient treatment facility.  Another consideration is if the 
symptoms of the defendant’s mental illness are active and severe.  The 
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prosecutor and court should be concerned about the defendant’s ability to 
participate in the program and to get to and from an outpatient program.71 
However, there may be circumstances where outpatient competency-
rendering treatment is appropriate.  For example, assume the defendant has 
successfully been receiving services through the civil commitment process72 
on a ninety-day Less Restrictive Order (LRO).73  If there are no 
dangerousness issues and the defendant is appropriately out of custody on 
the criminal matter, it may be possible for Western State or Eastern State to 
utilize the LRO program as both the LRO and the outpatient competency-
rendering treatment programs.74 
There is one exception to the mandatory treatment requirement.  If at any 
time during the proceeding the court finds that the defendant is not likely to 
be rendered competent within the applicable statutory competency-
rendering treatment period, the court skips or stops the competency-
rendering process.  The case proceeds in the same manner as if the 
competency-rendering treatment was unsuccessful.75  If, in the opinion of a 
professional person,76 the defendant is rendered competent, the defendant 
must be returned to court for a hearing.  If the court determines at that 
hearing that competency has been restored, the stay of proceedings must be 
lifted and the case will proceed.77  The court must take care to comply with 
RCW 10.77.065, to the extent it applies.78 
(1)  Extending Length of Inpatient CompetencyRenderingTreatment 
Beyond Fourteen Days 
The fourteen-day period for inpatient competency-rendering treatment 
includes only the time the defendant is actually at the treatment facility, and 
is in addition to reasonable time for transport to or from the facility.  Also, 
bear in mind that the fourteen-day inpatient period is “in addition to any 
unused time of the [competency] evaluation under RCW 10.77.060.”79  The 
relevant portion of RCW 10.77.060 relating to the “time” of the competency 
evaluation reads as follows: 
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For purposes of the examination, the court may order the defendant 
committed to a hospital or other suitably secure public or private 
mental health facility for a period of time necessary to complete 
the examination, but not to exceed fifteen days from the time of 
admission to the facility.  If the defendant is being held in jail or 
other detention facility, upon agreement of the parties, the court 
may direct that the examination be conducted at the jail or other 
detention facility.80 (emphasis added) 
The statute contains a fifteen-day time limit for evaluations at a hospital 
or other secure mental health facility, but contains no such time limit for an 
in-jail evaluation.81  The only way time spent awaiting an in-jail evaluation 
could count against the “unused time of the evaluation” is if the court 
considers a jail equivalent to a “hospital or other suitably secure public or 
private mental health facility.” 
How does one calculate the unused time for the competency evaluation in 
order to determine the total inpatient time available?  For evaluations 
conducted at Western State or Eastern State, the calculation is 
straightforward.  If the defendant stays at the hospital for the full fifteen 
days allowed under RCW 10.77.060(1)(a), there is no unused time to add, 
and the competency-rendering period would be fourteen days.  If the 
defendant stays at the hospital for only twelve days, then the unused time 
would be three days, for a competency-rendering treatment period of 
seventeen days. 
For evaluations conducted in the jail, the calculation should be just as 
straightforward.  For example, assume that on day one, a treatment-eligible 
nonfelony defendant is arraigned in custody and presents a competency 
issue.  The court issues an order for an evaluation that same day.  Assume 
further that Western State conducts the evaluation in the jail and that the 
next hearing date is seven days from the arraignment.  How many days of 
“unused time of the evaluation” remain?  Recent legislation and case law 
support an interpretation that the “unused time of the evaluation under 
RCW 10.77.060” in this example would be fifteen days, because the 
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evaluation did not occur in the hospital, which translates to twenty-nine 
days of inpatient competency-rendering treatment. 
The 2004 amendment to RCW 10.77.060 and the Washington Court of 
Appeals opinion in Weiss v. Thompson,82 supports such an interpretation of 
RCW 10.77.060 and 10.77.090.  Currently, RCW 10.77.060(1)(a) requires 
the parties’ approval for an in-jail evaluation.  If a jail were truly equivalent 
to a hospital or other secure mental health facility, the court would not need 
the parties’ permission to order that the evaluation occur in the jail.  The 
court would already have had that authority under the prior version of the 
statute, and thus the 2004 amendment would be unnecessary.83  And in 
Weiss, a pre-amendment case, Division One held that time spent in jail 
awaiting transport to Western State for competency-rendering treatment did 
not qualify as placement in a secure mental health facility for purposes of 
RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(I).84  However, the phrase “secure mental 
health facility” is sufficiently similar to the phrase “hospital or suitably 
secure public or private mental health facility,” as used in RCW 
10.77.060(1)(a), to justify a court giving it a similar interpretation.  Though 
Weiss predates the 2004 amendment to RCW 10.77.060, its reasoning is 
sound, and the supreme court denied review.85  Therefore, Weiss remains 
good law unless and until a conflicting case comes out of the court of 
appeals. 
(2)  Outpatient Competency-Rendering Treatment 
If the defendant remains incompetent after the inpatient competency-
rendering treatment, the court may order up to ninety days of outpatient 
competency-rendering treatment.  Outpatient treatment can only occur if the 
defendant is out of custody—the treatment providers are not able to provide 
treatment to a jail inmate.  If a defendant is unsuitable for outpatient 
competency-rendering treatment, e.g., because he or she is far too 
dangerous, the court will need to balance the potential benefits of outpatient 
competency-rendering treatment with the public-safety risks of releasing the 
222 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
PRISON AND DETENTION 
defendant from custody into outpatient treatment.  The court has two 
options.  It could order outpatient competency-rendering treatment 
following the unsuccessful inpatient treatment.  Alternatively, if the 
defendant is in custody, the court could dismiss the case and refer him or 
her to an evaluation and treatment facility for evaluation for possible civil 
commitment under RCW 71.05.86 
This discussion assumes that outpatient competency-rendering treatment 
is available.  That is not necessarily an accurate assumption, as noted 
previously.  The statute states that for outpatient competency-rendering 
treatment, DSHS will place the defendant on conditional release.87  It 
therefore appears to be the responsibility of DSHS to secure the treatment, 
though the court issues the treatment order.  To date DSHS has not 
contracted with local providers to provide such treatment, but Western State 
has advised the author that DSHS would make such treatment available if 
ordered.88  For that reason, the model orders direct Western State or Eastern 
State to provide the name(s) of the appropriate facility(ies).  However, that 
does not answer the question of what will happen if a court orders a 
defendant into outpatient competency-rendering treatment. 
The statute makes no clear provision for a court’s alternatives if a 
defendant violates the terms of outpatient treatment.  If the defendant is still 
reasonably likely to be rendered competent with the treatment, the court 
might decide to order the defendant back into the treatment program.  If the 
nature of the violation makes it likely that the defendant would not or could 
not comply with the treatment, then the court could find, based on the 
violation, that the defendant is unlikely to be rendered competent with 
further treatment.  The case would proceed in the same manner as if 
inpatient treatment was unlikely to restore the defendant’s competency.89  If 
the defendant had not previously been ordered into inpatient treatment, the 
court could consider inpatient treatment as an option.90 
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(3)  Medication as Part of Treatment 
The primary component of competency-rendering treatment is 
psychotropic medication.  In many instances the defendant will voluntarily 
take medication prescribed as part of the competency-rendering treatment.  
But in a large number of cases the defendant is likely to refuse to take 
medication voluntarily, and indeed may have a history of refusing to take 
such medication.  In that circumstance, the prosecution will want to obtain 
court authority for the treatment agency to administer involuntary 
medication as part of the treatment. 
Case law sets out the conditions under which the court may authorize 
involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering treatment.  By 
holding an evidentiary hearing, the court determines whether those 
conditions are met.  The hearing can be held at the same time as the hearing 
that determines whether the defendant is in the treatment-eligible or non-
treatment-eligible category.  The prosecution must present live testimony by 
a psychiatrist from the treatment facility, unless all parties are willing to 
take testimony by telephone. 
In Sell v. United States,91 the U. S. Supreme Court set out the 
constitutional parameters of a court’s authority to authorize the 
administration of involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering 
treatment.  The complexity and importance of the issue of involuntary 
medication, as it relates to competency-rendering treatment, necessitates the 
detailed discussion contained in a later portion of this article.92  
b)  Unsuccessful Competency-Rendering Treatment (or Treatment Unlikely 
to Succeed) for Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony Defendants 
If the competency-rendering treatment is unsuccessful, or if the evaluator 
opines that treatment is unlikely to succeed, the court must dismiss the case 
without prejudice.93  What happens after that depends on the defendant’s 
custody status at the time of the dismissal.94 
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(1)  In-Custody Defendants 
If the defendant is in custody at the time of dismissal, which as a practical 
matter means that the defendant’s inpatient treatment did not succeed, then 
the defendant must be detained and sent to an evaluation and treatment 
facility for up to seventy-two hours for a civil commitment evaluation.95  
The seventy-two-hour period begins to run on the next nonholiday weekday 
following the court order, and runs “to the end of the last nonholiday 
weekday within the seventy-two hour period.”96  For example, if the court 
order is issued on a Monday, the seventy-two-hour period begins on 
Tuesday and ends on Thursday.97  The same process applies if (1) the 
defendant is in custody, (2) the court finds that the defendant is not likely to 
regain competency, and (3) the defendant either skipped or discontinued 
competency-rendering treatment as required by statute.98 
The key question is this: to which evaluation and treatment facility 
should the defendant be sent?  The answer is somewhat complicated and 
affects more than just the decision of where to transport the defendant.  The 
issue, also, is one of cost allocation between the state and the county.99 
If the detention was considered a proceeding under RCW 10.77, then the 
state would be responsible for the cost of the detention, and the proper 
location for the detention would be Western State or Eastern State, 
depending on the details of the case.  The Attorney General’s Office would 
handle the commitment procedures from that point.  But if the detention 
was considered a proceeding under RCW 71.05, then the county would be 
responsible for the cost of the detention, and the proper location would be a 
local evaluation and treatment facility unless the county contracted with 
Western State or Eastern State for the services.  The county prosecutor 
would handle the commitment proceedings from that point.100 
(2) Out-of-Custody Defendants 
If the defendant is referred for civil commitment evaluation while on 
conditional release in the criminal case, which as a practical matter means 
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that the defendant’s outpatient treatment did not succeed, then the 
evaluation will occur at any location chosen by a statutorily required 
designated mental health professional (DMHP).101  That evaluation must 
occur within forty-eight hours of the referral.102  Unfortunately, the statute 
does not provide a remedy if the defendant fails to appear for the civil 
commitment evaluation, nor does it specify whether the remedy would be 
through the criminal case or the civil commitment process. 
There is one additional potential wrinkle.  Consider an example in which 
a nonfelony defendant is out of custody at the time of his or her competency 
evaluation.  Suppose the evaluation concludes that the defendant is 
incompetent to stand trial, and that neither inpatient nor outpatient 
competency-rendering treatment is likely to restore the defendant’s 
competency.  Suppose further that the court finds the defendant not 
competent and unlikely to regain competency.  Under those facts, the court 
must dismiss the case and order that the defendant be evaluated for civil 
commitment.103  Clearly the inpatient evaluation provision will not apply to 
our defendant, who is not in custody.104  The issue is whether the outpatient 
evaluation provision applies: is the defendant “on conditional release at the 
time of the dismissal”?105  Clearly the legislature would want such a 
defendant evaluated for possible civil commitment, but the question is how 
the legislature intended that to happen. 
One alternative is for the court to conclude that an out-of-custody 
defendant is essentially equivalent to a defendant on conditional release.106  
That makes sense if there are any conditions attached to the defendant’s 
release from custody, such as a condition that the defendant cooperate with 
the competency evaluation or a condition that the defendant commit no 
criminal law violations.  Under those facts, the defendant is arguably 
detained for purposes of the evaluation because his or her freedom is 
curtailed.  If the defendant is detained for a competency evaluation, whether 
or not the defendant was initially in custody, then the defendant is arguably 
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on a conditional release.  If so, then the court would order the DMHP to 
evaluate the defendant on an out-of-custody basis.107 
A second alternative is for the court to conclude that the defendant, 
though not held in jail, is in custody in the sense that he or she is subject to 
terms of release, and therefore his or her freedom has been curtailed by the 
court.  This is similar to the rationale that permits a person on probation to 
file a personal restraint petition even though he or she is not being held in 
custody.108  Under that line of logic, the court must order the defendant 
referred to Western State or Eastern State for an inpatient evaluation.109 
A third alternative may be available if the competency evaluation 
recommends that the defendant be evaluated for civil commitment by the 
DMHP.110  In that case, the court would be required to order the DMHP to 
conduct that evaluation pursuant to RCW 10.77.065.111 
A fourth alternative is for the court to conclude that the mandatory 
referral provisions of RCW 10.77 do not apply, but that the discretionary 
provision for non-treatment-eligible nonfelony defendants does.112  Under 
this alternative, the court, at least in theory, could choose not to refer the 
defendant, which runs contrary to the clear intent behind the mandatory 
referral provisions.113 
(3)  Transmittal of Information toTreatment Facility or DMHP 
If an in-custody defendant is detained and sent to an evaluation and 
treatment facility, that facility will only have seventy-two hours to decide 
whether to file a petition for civil commitment.114  If a defendant on 
conditional release is referred to the DMHP, the DMHP must examine the 
defendant within forty-eight hours.115  In either case, the treatment facility 
or the DMHP will immediately need records from the prosecutor.  Those 
records include the police report from the case, as well as other relevant 
information, including the defendant’s criminal history and a certified copy 
of the order setting forth the court’s finding that the defendant is in the 
treatment-eligible category.  Without that information and the order, the 
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county prosecutor or assistant attorney general will not be able to file a civil 
commitment petition on a timely basis. 
c)  Non-Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony Defendant Who is Incompetent 
If the court ultimately finds that a non-treatment-eligible nonfelony 
defendant is incompetent, then the court has these two alternatives: stay or 
dismiss the proceedings and detain the defendant for a civil commitment 
evaluation, or dismiss the case outright.116  The statute does not require that the 
defendant be in custody in order for the court to detain.  The dismissal should 
be without prejudice, just as for treatment-eligible nonfelony defendants.117  
The statute does not give any guidance for what happens if the court stays the 
proceedings, and it is unclear how that would impact the case.  The statute also 
fails to give any guidance to the court regarding what is essentially a mental 
health question: whether it is appropriate in a particular case to order that the 
DMHP evaluate the defendant for civil commitment. 
d)   Illustrative Examples 
The best way to understand the treatment-eligible and non-treatment-
eligible provisions applicable to nonfelony defendants is to compare three 
hypothetical fact patterns, one of which involves a felony case.  Defendant 
A is charged with second-degree theft for stealing a $750 overcoat in the 
wintertime.  Defendant B is charged with second-degree criminal trespass.  
Defendant C is charged with fourth-degree assault by means of intentionally 
inflicting bodily injury on another.  All three defendants have been 
evaluated by the staff at Western State as incompetent to stand trial.  None 
of the defendants have any criminal history, prior dismissals due to 
incompetency, or acquittals by reason of insanity.118 
Defendant A, charged with a felony, must be ordered into competency-
rendering treatment for up to ninety days.119  If treatment proves 
unsuccessful, the defendant could be ordered back for an additional ninety 
days of treatment, at the court’s discretion.120  If the defendant is still not 
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competent, and if the court or jury makes certain findings, the court may 
extend the treatment another six months.121  Ultimately, if the defendant 
does not regain competency, the court must dismiss the case without 
prejudice and either begin civil commitment proceedings or release the 
defendant.122 
Defendant B is a non-treatment-eligible nonfelony defendant, and the 
example assumes that RCW 10.77.065(1)(b) does not apply.  The court has 
two options.  It may stay or dismiss the proceedings and detain the 
defendant for sufficient time for the DMHP to evaluate the defendant for 
civil commitment.  In the alternative, it may dismiss the proceedings 
outright.123 
Defendant C is a treatment-eligible nonfelony defendant because the 
pending charge involves a violent act, namely, assault by intentionally 
inflicting bodily injury.  The court can order that Defendant C be placed at 
Western State for up to fourteen days of inpatient treatment to restore 
competency; this period may be extended for up to an additional fifteen 
days.124  At the end of that period, the defendant must return to court for a 
competency hearing.125  If he or she is still not competent, but the court 
determines that further treatment may restore competency, the court may 
order Defendant C to undergo outpatient treatment of up to ninety days on a 
conditional release.126  Of course, the court is also free to order outpatient 
treatment pursuant to a conditional release first, and then inpatient treatment 
if the conditional release is not successful.127  If, at the end of the treatment 
period, or at any time following notice and a hearing, the court determines 
that Defendant C is unlikely to return to competency, the court must dismiss 
the charges and refer Defendant C for evaluation for possible civil 
commitment.128 
C.  Involuntary Medication as Part of Competency-Rendering Treatment 
One cannot examine the competency-rendering process without 
considering the issue of involuntary medication.  As a general proposition, 
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defendants who are found incompetent suffer from acute episodes of severe 
mental illness that are treated primarily with psychotropic medication.129  
When in such an acute phase of illness, many defendants lack insight into 
their illness and, therefore, refuse to take medication.  The only feasible 
option available for rendering a defendant competent in such cases is 
involuntary medication.130 
The circumstances under which a court may constitutionally authorize 
involuntary medication for the sole purpose of restoring a criminal 
defendant’s competency to stand trial have become quite complex as a 
result of the Supreme Court decision in Sell.131  The purpose of this section 
is to discuss the Sell decision and its potential implications for the 
competency-rendering process in Washington. 
1.  Factual Setting in Sell 
Charles Sell and his wife were charged with fifty-six counts of mail 
fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money laundering.  
The government later charged him with attempting to murder an FBI agent 
and a potential witness in the fraud cases.  The fraud and attempted murder 
cases were joined for trial.132  Sell had exhibited bizarre behavior, and 
eventually a federal magistrate found him incompetent to stand trial and 
ordered that he be hospitalized for competency-rendering treatment at a 
federal facility.  The facility’s staff recommended that Sell take anti-
psychotic medication, which he refused to do.  At that point, the facility 
sought permission to medicate Sell involuntarily.133 
Following a review process, a psychiatrist at the facility authorized 
administering involuntary medication to Sell.  The facility administratively 
reviewed and upheld the psychiatrist’s determination.  The federal 
magistrate authorized involuntary medication as well.  The magistrate 
stayed the order so Sell could appeal the issue to the federal district court.  
The district court affirmed the magistrate’s order authorizing involuntary 
medication as the only viable way to render Sell competent to stand trial.  
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However, the district court found the magistrate’s determination—that Sell 
was dangerous—to be clearly erroneous.  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, focusing only on the fraud charges, also affirmed the district 
court’s order authorizing forced medication to render Sell competent to 
stand trial.  The U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Eighth 
Circuit’s ruling.134 
2.  Holding in Sell 
The Supreme Court found that the orders in Sell did not meet the 
necessary test and, thus, vacated the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and 
remanded the case.  The Court phrased the issue rather narrowly: Does the 
U.S. Constitution permit the government to involuntarily administer anti-
psychotic medication solely to render a defendant competent to stand trial 
for serious but nonviolent crimes?135  In a 6–3 opinion, the Supreme Court 
held that under limited circumstances, the Constitution permits the 
government to administer psychotropic medication involuntarily to a 
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges to render that 
defendant competent to stand trial.136  The Court pointed out that “the 
Government may pursue its request for forced medication on the grounds 
discussed in this opinion, including grounds related to the danger Sell poses 
to himself or others.”137  The Court cautioned that since “Sell’s medical 
condition may have changed over time, the Government should do so on the 
basis of current circumstances.”138 
3.  What the Sell Opinion Means in Practice 
In couching the issue, the Supreme Court noted that Sell was charged 
with serious but nonviolent crimes.139  While that seems to ignore the 
attempted murder charges in the case, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion focused 
“solely on the serious fraud charges,”140 which the Supreme Court appears 
to have accepted as a limit to its review.  As a practical matter, however, 
subsequent case law appears to render the distinction meaningless, as the 
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courts apply the Sell test to both violent and nonviolent charges.  The Sell 
opinion strongly implies that a court may not constitutionally order 
involuntary medication in a criminal case that involves non-serious charges. 
There are four questions that practitioners and trial courts must grapple 
with in the aftermath of Sell: (1) What is a “serious” crime?  (2) How will 
the Sell test be applied in practice?  (3) Can a trial court constitutionally 
authorize involuntary medication in a case involving a non-serious 
nonviolent crime solely for the purpose of restoring competency?  (4) How 
does Sell impact involuntary medication for purposes other than the sole 
purpose of restoring competency? 
a)  Defining “Serious” Crimes 
The Sell opinion seems to have accepted the Eighth Circuit’s 
determination that the fraud charges are “serious.”  The opinion’s lack of 
discussion of what constitutes a “serious” crime implies that the trial court 
must determine what is and what is not “serious.”  While the Sell opinion 
does not specify the criteria for a “serious” crime, statutory and case law 
have provided some guidance.141  Remember, unless the current charge is 
“serious,” the court cannot authorize involuntary medication, even if the 
defendant is charged with a felony or is a treatment-eligible nonfelony 
defendant.142 
(1)  Carries the Right to a Jury Trial 
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Evans focused on the constitutional 
right to a jury trial for guidance: a crime that is serious enough to warrant a 
jury trial is serious for the purpose of a Sell analysis.  Under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, a “serious” crime carries the right to a jury trial; a 
non-serious or “petty” crime does not.143  For federal law purposes, any 
crime carrying a maximum possible sentence of more than six months 
carries the right to a jury trial and is therefore “serious.”144  If the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis—labeling as “serious” any criminal charge that affords a 
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right to a jury trial—was applied in Washington, any criminal case would 
be potentially “serious.”  The Washington Constitution provides greater 
rights to a jury trial than its federal counterpart.  All persons charged with a 
crime carrying any potential jail term are entitled to a jury trial.145  That 
seems rather broad and, as discussed below, is most likely not the standard 
for a “serious” crime in Washington. 
(2)  Designated “Serious” by State Legislature 
In focusing on the maximum potential punishment to determine whether 
a crime is “serious” for Sell purposes, the Evans court explained that 
“[s]uch an approach respects legislative judgments regarding the severity of 
the crime.”146  In other words, a state legislature is given great latitude to 
define a “serious” crime.  The Washington legislature has exercised its 
discretion by declaring certain crimes as “serious” per se.147  The list 
includes some nonfelony crimes, such as any nonfelony domestic violence 
crime, harassment, and driving under the influence, or the local equivalents 
of these.148 
(3)  Determined “Serious” by Court 
Washington’s per se list of “serious” crimes also authorizes a court in a 
particular case to find that a crime is “serious” after weighing certain 
standards.  These standards include whether the offense involves bodily or 
emotional harm to another person, whether the offense impacts the local 
citizens’ basic need for security, the number of potential or actual victims or 
persons impacted by the alleged acts, and the maximum possible sentence 
for the crime.149 
(4)  Designated “Serious” by Local Legislature 
Prior drafts of the per se statute gave city and county legislatures the 
authority to declare additional categories of crimes as “serious” per se, on 
the basis of standards similar to those applicable to the courts.150  That 
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authority did not survive in the final version of the statute, so it appears that 
the state legislature intended to preempt the field except as to the extent it 
has delegated such authority to the courts. 
b)  Applying Sell in Practice 
The Supreme Court in Sell explained that there are four requirements for 
constitutionally imposing involuntary medication to restore a defendant’s 
competency to stand trial on serious charges.151  Although the Court never 
stated what standard of proof the trial court should apply in determining 
whether those four requirements have been met, the Second Circuit recently 
held in U.S. v. Gomes152 that the clear and convincing standard applies.  In 
State v. Hernandez-Ramirez,153 Division Two of the Court of Appeals, 
relying on the statutory standard for involuntary medication in the civil 
commitment context, adopted the same test.154  The Ninth Circuit has not 
yet weighed in on this issue.155 
The four requirements identified in the Sell opinion are: (1) administering 
involuntary medication to render the defendant competent must serve an 
important governmental interest in the case; (2) involuntary medication 
must significantly further that important governmental interest; (3) 
involuntary medication must be necessary to further that interest; and (4) 
involuntary medication must be medically appropriate for the particular 
defendant.156  Each of these requirements is discussed below. 
(1)  Important Governmental Interest 
The longer the potential sentence, or the potential for future confinement, 
the stronger the governmental interest in involuntary medication for 
competency-rendering treatment.  While there is an important interest in 
bringing to trial a defendant charged with a serious crime against persons or 
property, the trial court still must consider the facts of the individual case in 
evaluating the importance of that interest.157  The Sell opinion noted two 
specific considerations, namely, the potential for future confinement, 
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including civil commitment, and whether the defendant has already been 
confined for a lengthy time.158 
With respect to the potential for future confinement, the court will look to 
the crime charged.  For felonies, the court can calculate the potential 
standard sentencing range under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 
(SRA).159  For nonfelonies, the maximum sentence will be one year or 
ninety days, depending on the charge, and there may or may not be a 
mandatory minimum.160 
Under Washington’s civil commitment laws, there are some practical 
complications in estimating the potential for future civil commitment.  For 
example, it is virtually impossible for a trial court to know whether a 
defendant will be civilly committed, or even to have a well-informed basis 
on which to predict whether civil commitment is likely and if so, under 
what conditions.  Civil commitment proceedings are not necessarily 
handled by the same prosecuting agency, the same judge or court system, or 
the same defense attorney as the criminal case.161 
In addition, except for limited exceptions, civil commitment proceedings 
are confidential.162  However, in 2004, the legislature amended the 
confidentiality provisions to help open the lines of communication between 
the civil commitment and criminal justice systems when competency-
rendering treatment is at issue.163  Thus, civil commitment records and 
information under RCW 71.05 may now be disclosed to a court or its 
designee when there is a pending motion requesting court authority for 
involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering treatment under 
RCW 10.77.164  Additionally, the criminal court, when considering whether 
to authorize involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering 
treatment, is now required to ask the prosecutor and defense attorney, who 
are required to answer to the extent they are aware, whether the defendant is 
the subject of civil commitment proceedings.165 
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(2)  Significantly Furthers Governmental Interest 
Second, the trial court must conclude that involuntary medication would 
significantly further the governmental interest.  That means the court must 
find that the medication is substantially likely to restore competency, but at 
the same time be substantially unlikely to have side effects that will 
interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist in conducting a 
defense.166  This test is likely to pose far more problems for prosecutors in 
nonfelony cases than in felony cases.  With a fourteen- to twenty-nine-day 
competency-rendering period for nonfelony crimes,167 it is hard to imagine 
a large number of cases in which a qualified mental health professional 
could render an opinion that there is a substantial likelihood that involuntary 
medication will restore competency.  On the other hand, felonies carry a 
competency-rendering period of 90–365  days.168  In that amount of time, 
there is a greater likelihood that a qualified mental health professional could 
opine that there is a substantial likelihood the medication could restore 
competency.  Of course, the trial court is not bound by the opinion of the 
mental health professional, especially if the defense presents contradictory 
testimony from its own expert.169 
From a pragmatic as well as legal standpoint, a key question is whether 
statistical probabilities may be used to establish a substantial likelihood of 
restoration.  Federal case law supports the concept that the prosecution can 
rely upon a statistical probability that psychotropic medication will restore 
competency, though the cases do not specify a minimum probability that 
would still satisfy Sell.170 
Another key question is whether the prosecution must identify the 
particular medication or merely the class of medication that would be 
administered.  Unless the defendant’s mental health history shows that he or 
she has had particular success with a specific medication, it is unlikely the 
court could authorize involuntary medication.171  At the present time, 
Washington case law supports the proposition that the prosecution only 
needs to establish the class of medication to be administered.  In State v. 
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Hernandez-Ramirez,172 Division Two affirmed a trial court order 
authorizing involuntary medication on the basis of testimony, from two 
doctors, that antipsychotic medications are the typical form of treatment for 
the defendant’s mental illness.  The federal courts are divided; some require 
the prosecution to identify the specific medication to be administered,173 
while others require the prosecution to identify only the class of medication 
to be administered.174 
(3)  Necessary to Further Governmental Interest 
The third Sell requirement for constitutionally authorizing involuntarily 
administered medication is that the medication must be necessary to further 
the important governmental interest.  Demonstrating the necessity of 
involuntarily medicating a defendant requires a finding that less intrusive 
alternatives are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.175  In the 
Sell opinion, the Supreme Court included the troubling example of “a court 
order to the defendant backed by the contempt power” as a less intrusive 
alternative.176  This suggestion is troubling because, with respect to the 
opinion’s concerns about constitutional due process, it is difficult to 
differentiate between “involuntary medication” on the one hand and 
“voluntary medication” pursuant to a court order backed by contempt power 
on the other.  Both contain an element of coercion that was a key 
constitutional concern for the Sell Court.  This language runs contrary to the 
tenor of the majority’s entire discussion of the involuntary medication issue. 
Furthermore, the Court’s language implies that the trial court should take 
into consideration the defendant’s willingness to take medication 
voluntarily.  On the surface, this suggestion appears to be a feasible 
possibility in felony cases because of their long restoration periods.  The 
trial court could order the defendant to be transported to Western State or 
Eastern State and if the defendant takes his or her medication, nothing 
further needs to be done.  If the defendant refuses, he or she could be 
returned to court for a hearing on the issue of involuntary medication, and if 
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the trial court authorizes this action, there would still be sufficient time left 
in the treatment period for the competency-rendering treatment to be 
successful. 
This wait-and-see approach, however, creates logistical problems that are 
not addressed in the Sell opinion.  For example, bed space at Western State 
and Eastern State is limited, and using that bed space for the sole purpose of 
determining whether the defendant is willing to take medication voluntarily 
takes that bed space away from another defendant.  That, in turn, could 
result in longer transport times for those defendants waiting for bed space.  
In addition, resources expended waiting to see if a defendant will take 
medication voluntarily would be unavailable to other defendants who need 
treatment.177  Though quite valid, these drawbacks do not relate to the 
specific defendant who is the subject of the “Sell hearing.”  It is unlikely 
that fiscal concerns and policy choices about the extent of services available 
at state psychiatric hospitals would satisfy Sell’s constitutional criteria.   
In nonfelony cases, by contrast, the relatively short inpatient restoration 
period does not lend itself to a wait-and-see approach.  Waiting to see if a 
defendant agrees to take medication voluntarily could use up several days, 
or even one week, of treatment time.  That would leave little, if any, time to 
return the defendant to court, hold an involuntary medication hearing, return 
the defendant to inpatient treatment, and still have a substantial likelihood 
of successful restoration.  While the court could consider ordering 
outpatient treatment of up to ninety days for a nonfelony defendant in order 
to see if he or she voluntarily takes medication, the downside of this 
approach outweighs both its suitability and its usefulness.  First and 
foremost, outpatient competency-rendering treatment may not be 
appropriate for the defendant because of the defendant’s risk to the 
community.  It is also possible that the defendant’s level of functioning is 
such that the defendant is incapable of complying with outpatient treatment.  
Second, it is much more difficult for an outpatient treatment facility to 
monitor whether the defendant is voluntarily taking his or her medication, 
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especially if the medication is not the type that can be monitored by testing 
the medication levels in the defendant’s blood.  Although this concern can 
be mitigated somewhat by delivering medication through an intramuscular 
shot at specific intervals, not every medication can be administered in this 
manner. 
(4)  Medically Appropriate 
Lastly, the trial court must find that involuntary medication is medically 
appropriate.  That means the medication is in the defendant’s best medical 
interest in light of the defendant’s medical condition.178  Presumably, the 
trial court would need to consider the potential harmful side effects of  the 
medication, either medical or related to the defendant’s ability to obtain a 
fair trial.  It may be hard to imagine how relieving severe symptoms of a 
mental disorder could do anything but benefit a defendant.  But consider a 
situation in which a defendant suffered severe emotional or psychological 
trauma in his or her past, and the psychiatrist testified at the “Sell hearing” 
that involuntarily medicating the defendant would likely trigger a severe 
psychological response because of that trauma, which would do far more 
psychological harm than good.179  The benefits of the involuntary 
medication would be more than offset by the potential emotional or 
psychological harm to that particular defendant. 
c)  Authorizing Involuntary Medication in Cases Involving Non-Serious, 
Nonviolent Crimes Solely for the Purpose of Restoring Competency 
The Sell case sets a very high standard for authorizing involuntary 
medication in cases involving serious crimes.  It is unlikely that a court may 
constitutionally authorize involuntary medication if the defendant is not 
charged with a serious crime. 
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d)  Involuntary Medication for Reasons Other Than Restoring Competency 
The Sell opinion noted that the trial court does not have to go through the 
tests set out in Sell if the medication is warranted for a purpose other than 
competency-rendering treatment. The Supreme Court cited Washington v. 
Harper180 as an example.181  In Harper, the Court upheld procedures for 
involuntarily medicating prison inmates on the basis of potential 
dangerousness.  The difficulty with basing involuntary medication on 
dangerousness considerations is that there must be some procedural scheme 
under which the trial court could also act.  The civil commitment statute 
clearly states that a person suffering from a mental disorder “may not be 
involuntarily committed for treatment of such disorder except pursuant to 
provisions of [RCW 71.05], chapter 10.77 RCW, chapter 71.06 RCW, 
chapter 71.34 RCW, transfer pursuant to RCW 72.68.031 through 
72.68.037, or pursuant to court ordered evaluation and treatment not to 
exceed 90 days pending a criminal trial or sentencing.”182  Unless the 
defendant is already engaged in the civil commitment process under RCW 
71.05 or some other statutory commitment process, it seems unlikely that a 
trial court could order involuntary medication on the basis of dangerousness 
without offending principles of either statutory or constitutional procedural 
due process. 
D.  Mandatory Referrals for Civil Commitment Evaluation 
The competency evaluator’s report must include a recommendation to the 
court regarding whether the DMHP should examine the defendant for possible 
civil commitment, and whether the court should keep the defendant under its 
control.183  The Act created a process which requires courts to refer a 
defendant for a civil commitment evaluation if the competency evaluation 
recommends it.184  The court must make the referral even if the court 
ultimately finds the defendant competent.185  Given the tragic stabbing death of 
a retired firefighter, which created much of the impetus behind the Act,186 it 
seems likely that the legislature intended that this process serve as a catch-all 
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safety net for situations not covered by other provisions of the competency 
statutes.  Unfortunately, there are some gaps in this catch-all provision.187  
However, the legislature can eliminate those gaps by amending the statute to 
provide for a smoother transition from the competency restoration process to 
the civil commitment process.188 
IV. DEFENDANTS AT THE POST-JUDGMENT PHASE 
A defendant who is competent before the judgment may become 
incompetent at the post-judgment phase.189  Post-judgment competency 
issues may arise either at a sentencing hearing or at a probation violation 
hearing.  The purpose of this section is to identify the complex issues 
involving a defendant’s competency to proceed at the post-judgment phase.  
The section begins by discussing what constitutes a judgment and 
examining how that definition works in practice.  After examining the 
similarities between the pre-judgment and post-judgment competency 
processes, the section concludes by exploring in great detail the differences 
between those two processes and illustrating the impact of those 
differences. 
A. Defining Post-Judgment Cases Under Ch. 10.77 RCW 
Any discussion of the consequences of a defendant’s incompetency at the 
post-judgment phase presupposes that the term “judgment” in the criminal 
context is clearly defined; that is not the case.  As explained by noted legal 
scholar Karl Tegland, in the felony context,190 the “rules [of appellate 
procedure] make no effort to define a final judgment, and perhaps wisely 
so.  At common law, a final judgment was one that disposed of all of the 
issues as to all of the parties . . . .  No better definition seems to have 
evolved.”191  Mr. Tegland noted that in the nonfelony context, “courts have 
had difficulty defining a final judgment except in a circular fashion.  
However, final judgments in courts of limited jurisdiction will generally be 
. . . the judgment and sentence in a criminal case.”192 
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One source of guidance in interpreting the meaning of “final judgment” 
might be the criminal court rules.  For example, the procedural rules for 
superior and municipal/district courts provide that a “judgment of 
conviction” must include “the verdict . . . and the adjudication and 
sentence.”193  That implies that a judgment must include the sentence.  But 
for purposes of post-judgment relief, a motion for arrest of judgment must 
be filed and served within ten days after the verdict or decision for felonies 
and five days after the verdict or decision for nonfelonies.194  By statute, a 
collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may not “be 
filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment 
and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.”195 
One might also look to the practical nature of the proceeding rather than 
its name to determine whether the case is pre- or post-judgment.  The 
difficulty with this approach is that the distinction is not clearly spelled out, 
leaving the courts too little guidance, which in turn could result in courts 
across the state treating the same type of proceedings inconsistently.  Post-
judgment cases generally fall into either of two categories: cases in which 
there has been a guilty plea or guilty finding, and cases in which the 
defendant is obligated to fulfill certain conditions in order to have charges 
dismissed or reduced to less serious ones.   
1.  Guilty Plea or Finding 
a)  Sentencing 
Before a court can reach sentencing, there must be a conviction of some 
sort, which can result from a guilty plea or a finding of guilt.  As discussed 
above, the court rules require a criminal judgment to include the sentence 
imposed.  Sentencing does not always occur at the time of conviction, so it 
is conceivable that a defendant could be competent at the time he or she is 
convicted but become incompetent at a sentencing hearing held weeks or 
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months later.  Court rules require that the written judgment include the 
sentence imposed, and because a defendant cannot be sentenced while 
incompetent,196 a sentencing hearing appears to have one foot in the pre-
judgment camp and the other in the post-judgment camp. 
b.  Suspended Sentence 
Suspended sentences, authorized by statute in both felony197 and 
nonfelony198 cases, provide the classic example of post-judgment matters.  
Stated simply, a suspended sentence occurs when the court imposes a 
sentence but suspends execution of all or a portion of the sentence.199  
According to the Criminal Rules, the “judgment” regarding a conviction 
must contain, among other things, the sentence.200  The terms of a 
suspended sentence are reflected in the judgment and sentence, thereby 
meeting the definition of judgment.  Thus, a probation violation proceeding 
involving a suspended sentence is clearly a post-judgment matter. 
c)  Deferred Sentence 
Deferred sentences are creatures of municipal and district courts.201  With 
a deferred sentence, the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial, 
but the court defers imposing sentence for a designated period of time until 
the defendant has completed certain prescribed conditions.  If the conditions 
are completed, the case is dismissed.202  If the defendant willfully violates 
the conditions, the court has the discretion to revoke the deferred sentence 
and impose either a straight sentence or a suspended sentence. 
Interpreting the court rules strictly leads to the conclusion that a court 
order deferring sentence following a conviction would not be considered a 
“judgment” unless, and until, the court revoked the deferred sentence and 
imposed either a straight sentence or a suspended sentence.  However, the 
Washington Supreme Court recognized the unfair position a defendant 
would face if a deferred sentence were not considered a “judgment.”  In 
State v. Proctor, the supreme court explained that such a defendant would 
          Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 243 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
“be confronted with a ‘Hobson’s choice’ between waiving his or her appeal, 
and serving a sentence or paying a fine or both, to secure deferment; or 
insisting that a judgment and sentence be imposed that he or she could 
exercise the constitutional guarantee of ‘the right to appeal in all cases.’”203 
In order to avoid such an unfair result, the court found that a deferred 
sentence is an appealable order.  In other words, at least in the context of a 
deferred sentence, a finding or verdict of guilty need not include a judgment 
and sentence in order to be an appealable “judgment.”  The reasoning in 
Proctor makes similar sense in the competency context and, although a 
deferred sentence differs from a suspended sentence in the sense that the 
court does not “sentence” the defendant following a guilty verdict, guilty 
finding, or guilty plea, a deferred sentence does appear to be a post-
judgment matter. 
d)  Dispositional Continuance and Deferred Prosecution 
Dispositional continuances204 and deferred prosecutions are also creatures 
of municipal and district courts.  Because they have some aspects that are 
more like pre-judgment cases and some that are more like post-judgment 
cases, they pose more difficult issues than deferred or suspended sentences, 
which are clearly post-judgment matters.  From a purely technical 
standpoint, dispositional continuances and deferred prosecutions are pre-
judgment matters: the court does not enter a finding of guilty, either by plea 
or following trial.  Procedurally and pragmatically, however, dispositional 
continuances and deferred prosecutions are more similar to post-judgment 
probation cases than to pre-judgment cases, and it seems more logical to 
treat them as post-judgment cases.  The conditions imposed as part of the 
dispositional continuance, or deferred prosecution, are similar to conditions 
of probation that might be imposed as part of a suspended or deferred 
sentence, and are often monitored by a probation officer.  And if the court 
finds the defendant willfully failed to comply with the terms of the 
dispositional continuance or deferred prosecution, the court can revoke the 
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agreement, read the police report and, in all likelihood, find the defendant 
guilty.  The defendant has essentially given up his or her right to a 
meaningful trial, and the dispositional continuance or deferred prosecution 
is more along the lines of a submittal.205 
A dispositional continuance is an agreement between the prosecution and 
the defendant.  If the defendant fulfills the conditions of the agreement, the 
court either amends the charge to a less serious one or dismisses the charge 
outright.  If the court finds the defendant willfully failed to comply with the 
agreement, it has discretion to revoke the dispositional continuance and 
determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on the documents 
submitted as part of the agreement.206 
Deferred prosecutions are a statutorily authorized form of dispositional 
continuance, and are limited to nonfelony crimes that are “the result of or 
caused by alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental problems for which the 
person is in need of treatment and unless treated the probability of future 
reoccurrence is great . . . .”207  If the defendant successfully completes the 
conditions of the deferred prosecution, the court dismisses the case.208  If 
not, the court may revoke the deferred prosecution, read the police report, 
and determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on the police 
report.209  Deferred prosecutions differ from dispositional continuances in 
one other respect: the court may grant a petition for deferred prosecution 
over the prosecution’s objection.210 
B.  Proceedings Common to Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Competency 
Matters 
1.  Ordering the Competency Evaluation 
If the court believes that the defendant’s competency is at issue, even in a 
post-judgment matter, it seems clear that the court must order a competency 
evaluation and conduct a competency hearing.  RCW 10.77.060, which 
applies to competency evaluations, does not appear by its terms to be 
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limited to pre-conviction matters. The court may order a competency 
evaluation of a defendant, “[w]henever . . . there is reason to doubt his or 
her competency.”211  If the court finds the defendant competent, then the 
sentencing or probation violation matter can proceed.  But if the court finds 
the defendant incompetent, then the court must determine what options exist 
in the absence of clear statutory direction. 
2.  Proceedings Halted 
Under statutory law, the court may not sentence an incompetent 
defendant; a defendant may not be “tried, convicted or sentenced” while 
incompetent.212  Under case law, probation violation hearings are treated 
similarly.  In State v. Campbell, the supreme court held that the trial court 
was powerless to alter a defendant’s probation during the time he was at 
Western State Hospital being evaluated for competency.213 
C.  Different Proceedings for Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment 
Competency Matters 
The lack of statutory process for defining and handling post-judgment 
and quasi-post-judgment cases sets up a classic form over substance trap.  
The form factor, based on a literal reading of court rules, requires the court 
to treat many settled cases in a manner not contemplated by the competency 
statute or by the parties to the case.  The substance factor recognizes that 
many cases settle in a fashion other than by straight guilty plea or guilty 
verdict.  Yet it may not take into account some subtle nuances that arise 
regarding the court’s jurisdictional period.  Each type of resolution that is 
arguably post-judgment is discussed in turn below. 
1.  Competency-Rendering Treatment 
The most significant difference between pre- and post-judgment matters 
is whether the court may order that the defendant undergo competency-
rendering treatment.  The competency-rendering provisions specify the 
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conditions under which a felony or nonfelony defendant at the pre-judgment 
stage is eligible for competency-rendering treatment;214 there are no similar 
provisions for the post-judgment phase.  As this section demonstrates, one 
can make two contrasting arguments—one of which would limit the court’s 
authority to authorize competency-rendering treatment and the other of 
which would expand its authority. 
The first argument is that the court lacks authority to impose 
competency-rendering treatment upon an incompetent defendant at the post-
judgment phase.  Under this view, the lack of statutory authority for 
competency-rendering treatment reflects the legislature’s intent to limit 
competency-rendering treatment to pre-judgment cases. 
The contrasting argument is that the court has inherent authority to order 
the defendant into competency-rendering treatment.  The difficulty with this 
approach is that the few cases discussing the court’s inherent authority to 
address competency issues apply either to ordering a competency evaluation 
or to holding a competency hearing.215  In addition, the competency-
rendering treatment provisions are rather comprehensive. 
The extent to which the legislature intended to leave room for a court to 
exercise an inherent authority not granted to it by statute is certainly open to 
debate.  Although the factual setting in Campbell included competency-
rendering treatment for a defendant facing probation violation proceedings, 
the supreme court never reached the issue of whether the trial court had 
inherent authority to order that treatment.216 
Even if the court has inherent authority to order competency-rendering 
treatment in a sentencing or probation violation matter, the issue of the 
extent of that authority is still problematic.  It seems illogical to think that a 
court has broader inherent authority to order treatment in a post-judgment 
case than it has statutory authority to do so in a pre-judgment case.  
Otherwise, there would be no need for the statutory authority. 
Two fact patterns illustrate the point.  First, if a nonfelony non-treatment-
eligible defendant is awaiting trial, the court could not order competency-
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rendering treatment.  Does it make sense, then, that the court could use its 
inherent authority to order competency-rendering treatment if the defendant 
were awaiting a probation violation hearing instead of a trial?  Second, if a 
felony defendant or a nonfelony treatment-eligible defendant is awaiting 
trial, the court must order competency-rendering treatment.  Does it make 
sense that the court could use its inherent authority to order competency-
rendering treatment for a longer period in a post-judgment case than it could 
in a pre-judgment case? 
 Logic therefore implies that if a court has inherent authority to order 
competency-rendering treatment in a sentencing or probation violation 
matter, its authority is defined and limited, at least in part, by the pre-
judgment restoration provisions.  Yet, the more the court must rely on a 
statute to define and limit its inherent authority, the weaker the argument 
that the court has that inherent authority in the first place.  But even if the 
court does have such inherent authority, the court has the discretion to 
exercise it or decline to exercise it. 
2.  Consequences if Defendant Not Competent 
a)  Dismissal of Charges 
The competency-rendering provisions for pre-judgment cases expressly 
require the court to dismiss the case without prejudice if the defendant 
either remains incompetent following competency-rendering treatment or is 
ineligible for competency-rendering treatment.217  Because suspended and 
deferred sentences are expressly post-judgment matters,218 there is no 
danger of an absurd result, such as requiring the court to dismiss a case in 
which the defendant has been convicted. 
b.  Sentencing Hearings 
Sentencing hearings occur only after a finding of guilt.  The most logical 
interpretation is that sentencing is a post-judgment matter.  However, 
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sentencing might arguably be called a pre-judgment matter, in that the court 
rules require that the judgment include an order setting out the sentence,219 
but a defendant may not be sentenced while he or she is incompetent.220  
This means that the court cannot issue an order on judgment and sentencing 
as required by court rule.  Yet such a strict interpretation leads to an absurd 
result.  Assume a defendant is competent to stand trial and is convicted by a 
jury.  Assume further that between the jury verdict and the sentencing 
hearing the defendant becomes incompetent.  If sentencing was considered 
pre-judgment and the defendant was incompetent, either following 
competency-rendering treatment or if competency-rendering treatment was 
not authorized, then the court must dismiss the case without prejudice.221  
However, there is no statutory mechanism by which the court may vacate 
the conviction, which means the defendant has been convicted in a case in 
which the charge has been dismissed. 
The analysis is no simpler if one treats sentencing as a post-judgment 
matter.  The court must still grapple with one very thorny issue: what 
should the court do about sentencing the defendant?  Absent specific 
legislation, the court has three possible alternatives, though none is without 
drawbacks. 
(1)  Continue Sentencing to Re-Evaluate Competency 
One alternative is to continue sentencing to re-evaluate the defendant’s 
competency at a later date.  There are some difficult questions raised by this 
approach.  For example, how long can the court keep continuing the case?  
If the defendant is in custody, there are serious due process issues in 
continuing a case for an indeterminate time while the defendant remains in 
custody.222 
Even if the defendant is not in custody, there are other difficult issues.  
Superior, municipal, and district courts have varying periods of probation, 
depending on the particular crime for which the defendant is convicted.223  
But what happens if the court cannot impose a sentence?  How often can the 
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court order competency evaluations?  At some point, continued evaluations 
become futile.  Can the court decide not to order future evaluations?  
Suppose the court orders the defendant to return to be re-evaluated.  Can the 
court order that the defendant be sent to Western State or Eastern State for 
an inpatient evaluation?  Suppose the court orders instead that the defendant 
be evaluated on an outpatient basis, but the defendant fails to show for the 
evaluation.  Does the court have authority to issue a bench warrant when the 
court has already found the defendant incompetent?  Finally, what does the 
court do if the defendant is in custody?  It may seem like there are a lot of 
questions without any obvious answers.  That is why it is better to resolve 
competency issues before trial or a plea. 
(2)  Close the Case Administratively 
A second alternative is to take no action for a period of time and close the 
case administratively, unless the court has reason to believe the defendant’s 
mental state has changed for the better.  The primary advantage of this 
alternative is closure on the case.  It is also possible, especially in larger 
urban jurisdictions, that the defendant will come back into the system on a 
new charge and either be competent to proceed, or eligible for competency-
rendering treatment.224  But there are real dangers in this approach from a 
public-safety policy perspective that generally substantially outweigh the 
advantages.  The notion of waiting for a mentally ill defendant to commit a 
new crime so he or she can be sentenced on an older crime is risky.  Closing 
out a case without trying to sentence the defendant does nothing to protect 
public safety or stop future criminal behavior by the defendant.  This 
approach should be used with extreme caution and only after serious 
consideration. 
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(3)  Be Sure the Defendant is Competent Before Going to Trial or Taking a 
Guilty Plea 
Some, though probably not all, sentencing competency issues can be 
avoided with advance planning.  Sentencing often occurs shortly after 
conviction at trial or entry of a guilty plea.  If there is any reason to doubt 
the defendant’s competency at this earlier stage, it is better to seek a 
competency evaluation before the verdict or finding of guilt than to wait 
until sentencing to do so.  First, due process precludes convicting an 
incompetent defendant.  Second, it is much more difficult to resolve 
competency issues at the sentencing phase than it is at the guilt phase. 
Consider State v. Marshall.225  Henry Marshall pled guilty to murder, and 
the trial court, after a summary colloquy, found that he was competent to 
enter the plea.  After the plea, the prosecution notified Marshall’s attorney 
that it was seeking the death penalty.226  Marshall moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea on the ground of incompetency at the time of the plea, but the 
trial court denied his motion.227  The Washington Supreme Court held that, 
“where a defendant moves to withdraw [a] guilty plea with evidence the 
defendant was incompetent when the plea was made, the trial court must 
either grant the motion to withdraw [the] guilty plea or convene a formal 
competency hearing required by RCW 10.77.060.”228  Since the trial court 
did neither, the supreme court vacated Marshall’s conviction and remanded 
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.229 
In lieu of vacating Marshall’s conviction, the court could have remanded 
the case for the trial court to conduct a retrospective competency hearing at 
the time of sentencing to determine the defendant’s competency at the time 
of the guilty plea or guilty finding.230  Because competency can change over 
time, the accuracy of such a retrospective hearing may be open to question, 
especially if a significant amount of time has passed between the plea or 
finding of guilt and the sentencing hearing.231 
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c)  Probationary Period 
(1)  Suspended and Deferred Sentences 
If the defendant is incompetent to proceed with the revocation hearing, 
does that toll the running of the probationary period?  There is authority to 
support the conclusion that the probation jurisdiction is tolled while the 
defendant is incompetent.  Campbell232 involved a defendant on felony 
probation under the old indeterminate sentencing law.233  The supreme court 
held that, during the time the defendant was committed to a mental hospital 
to determine his competency, he was beyond the supervision of the court.234  
Consequently, the defendant’s term of probation was tolled during that time 
and re-commenced once he regained competency.235 
In Spokane v. Marquette,236 the supreme court applied Campbell and 
other cases involving tolling felony probation to the issue of tolling 
probation in a nonfelony case when a defendant has failed to appear at a 
hearing.237  The court noted that although Campbell and the other cited 
cases involved felony probation, “the principle is the same in municipal 
court, so we find them persuasive.”238  It therefore appears that Campbell 
applies to municipal and district courts.239 
Issues left unresolved include how long probation should be tolled, and 
what event will cause probation to re-commence.  If the reasoning of 
Campbell and other cases involving tolling probation is applied, then 
probation is to be tolled as long as the defendant remains incompetent.  If 
so, then what mechanism exists to restart the probation period?  One 
alternative is to re-commence the probation period once the defendant 
appears before the court in which the probation matter is pending to 
establish that he or she is now competent.  This is consistent with the time-
for-trial rules when a defendant fails to appear.  The time-for-trial period 
begins running when the defendant appears again before the court.240  It is 
important to note, though, that the defendant, who might be incompetent for 
a long or short period before regaining competency, is likely ill-equipped to 
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initiate the process by which the probation period and conditions 
recommence. 
(2)  Dispositional Continuances and Deferred Prosecutions 
As long as the court issues a written order for a competency evaluation, 
there should be no time-for-trial issues.  The time-for-trial period is tolled 
once the court issues a written order for a competency evaluation.241  The 
triggering event is the written order for an evaluation; it is not enough for 
the court to note that the issue has been raised.242  The time-for-trial period 
re-commences when the court issues a written order finding the defendant 
competent.243  If the defendant entered into a two-year dispositional 
continuance, the time-for-trial period would be tolled during the period of 
incompetency.244 
With respect to deferred prosecutions, before the court can accept a 
petition for deferred prosecution, it must find that the defendant has 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to a speedy trial.245  In 
addition, the “[d]elay in bringing a case to trial caused by a petitioner 
requesting deferred prosecution as provided for in this chapter shall not be 
grounds for dismissal.”246 
d)  Modifying “Probation” Conditions 
The court in Campbell stated in dictum that the trial court in that case 
was “powerless to alter defendant’s probation” during the time he was being 
treated at Western State.247  That makes sense because the probationary 
period was also tolled while the defendant was undergoing competency-
rendering treatment.  While the extent to which Campbell applies to district 
and municipal court probation has not been litigated, the reasoning still 
seems applicable, especially in light of Marquette.248  Dispositional 
continuances are agreements between the prosecution and the defendant.  
Analogizing to true probation cases and Campbell, it would seem that the 
court could not modify the terms of the dispositional continuance either.  
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The deferred prosecution statute sets forth mandatory conditions.249  Clearly 
the court could not modify mandatory conditions, whether or not the 
defendant is competent to stand trial.  Under the reasoning of Campbell, the 
court would have no authority to modify any of the discretionary conditions 
either.250 
e)  Referral to Civil Commitment System 
Regardless of how the court decides the issue of its inherent authority to 
order competency-rendering treatment in a post-judgment case, there are 
three situations in which the court would need to consider whether, and 
how, to refer the defendant for a potential civil commitment evaluation 
under RCW 71.05.251  The first situation is when the court finds that it does 
not have inherent authority to order the defendant competent.  The second is 
if the court finds that it does have inherent authority, but chooses not to 
order the competency-rendering treatment.  The third is if the court orders 
the competency-rendering treatment, but the defendant remains 
incompetent. 
From a public-safety standpoint, it is vital that the court consider 
referring the defendant to the DMHP for civil commitment evaluation under 
any of those three scenarios.  But the mandatory referral provision does not 
appear on its face to require that the court order the DMHP to evaluate the 
defendant if he or she is awaiting sentencing or a probation violation 
hearing.252  Nor do other provisions of the statutory scheme provide 
guidance.  The court has express statutory authority to detain an 
incompetent defendant for civil commitment evaluation prior to judgment, 
but there is no such express authority for post-judgment cases.253  While one 
might argue the old standby of inherent authority to detain the defendant for 
a civil commitment evaluation, there is very little support for that authority.  
Detaining a defendant for civil commitment evaluation is far different than 
committing a defendant in a criminal case for competency evaluation.  The 
former more closely resembles a civil commitment proceeding, which is 
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governed by an entirely different statutory scheme; the latter is more similar 
to the criminal procedures applicable to nonfelony defendants at the pre-
judgment state.254 
 The only practical procedure would be for the court to direct the DMHP 
to evaluate the defendant for possible civil commitment, but to do so prior 
to the court’s decision to strike the sentencing or probation violation hearing 
because of the defendant’s incompetency.  If the defendant is already in 
custody, the court avoids having to detain the defendant in custody solely 
for purposes of the civil commitment evaluation.  If the defendant is out of 
custody, the court could order the defendant to report to the DMHP at a 
specified location, prior to or at the hearing.  If the defendant fails to appear 
for the evaluation before the court strikes the hearing, then the court could 
issue a bench warrant.  This procedure is less than satisfying. 
V. GETTING TO WHERE WE NEED TO BE 
The issues identified above relate to all aspects of the criminal justice 
process, from arraignment to sentencing, and overlap the civil commitment 
system in many places.255  This section proposes solutions, described in 
greater detail below, that resolve those issues in a global fashion; they 
should be instituted as a whole in order to work effectively.  The starting 
point is the definition of mental illness in both systems.  The legislature 
should replace the phrase “mental disease or defect” in the competency 
process with the phrase “mental disorder,” defined by its corresponding 
definition in the civil commitment statute.  The legislature can also increase 
capacity and improve the efficiency of the competency process by 
eliminating unnecessary components of the evaluation, thus simplifying the 
competency-rendering process for both pre- and post-disposition cases.  
Finally, there must be a smoother transition from the competency evaluation 
process to the civil commitment process. 
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A.  Redefine the Mental Illness Component 
One might say that the entire competency process revolves around the 
definition of competency: as a result of some form of mental illness, does 
the defendant lack the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or 
to assist in his or her own defense?256  Similarly, one might say that the civil 
commitment process also revolves around the definition of mental illness.257  
To the extent that the two processes overlap, it makes sense both legally and 
from a mental health standpoint to use the same phrase and the same 
definition of mental illness.  To differentiate between “mental disease or 
defect” and “mental disorder” is to split hairs; it makes more sense to 
maintain a consistent definition.  Although the court in Klein had the 
opportunity to incorporate the civil commitment definition of “mental 
disorder” into the competency statute, it did not do so; indeed, the opinion 
does not even mention the civil commitment statutes.258  The legislature 
should exercise its prerogative by changing the phrase “mental disease or 
defect” in the competency statute to “mental disorder,” and incorporate the 
definition of mental disorder contained in the civil commitment statute.259 
B.  Remove Unnecessary Complexity from the Evaluation Process 
1.  Limit the Competency Evaluation to its Necessary Components 
The competency process involves an interrelated system rather than a 
collection of separate procedures.  That system is collapsing from its own 
weight,260 due, at least in part, to the fact that the number of evaluations261 
and the competency-rendering process262 have changed dramatically over 
the years, while the basic contents of a competency evaluation report have 
changed little over the past thirty years.263  This section discusses several 
ways to reduce the length of time and the amount of resources it takes to 
complete a competency evaluation without jeopardizing public safety. 
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a)  Eliminate the “Substantial Danger” Portion of the Dangerousness 
Assessment 
Under current law, competency evaluations must include an assessment 
of the defendant’s dangerousness, expressed in two forms: an opinion as to 
whether the defendant poses a substantial danger unless kept under further 
control, and an opinion as to whether the defendant should be referred for a 
civil commitment evaluation.264  The biggest step in safely reducing the 
resources devoted solely to competency evaluations is to eliminate the 
assessment of whether the defendant presents a substantial danger to public 
safety, while retaining the assessment as to whether the defendant should be 
evaluated for civil commitment.265 
The opinion regarding whether the defendant is a substantial danger 
relates directly to whether the court may extend competency-rendering 
treatment for a felony defendant by an additional 180 days.266  It also relates 
directly to whether the court is required to order such an evaluation, even if 
it finds the defendant competent.267  However, that assessment comes with a 
very high price tag: time spent evaluating and reporting on a defendant’s 
potential dangerousness is time that cannot be spent evaluating other 
defendants’ capacity to stand trial.  The result is what is currently 
happening: the state mental health system cannot handle the volume of 
competency evaluations ordered.  In addition, the “substantial danger” 
assessment’s value to the court’s determination as to whether the felony 
competency-rendering period must be extended is dubious at best.  The 
court does not consider the competency evaluation until months after the 
evaluation occurs,268 by which time the dangerousness assessment is stale.  
Setting a specific competency-rendering period for felony defendants, as 
recommended below,269 would eliminate the need for using the substantial 
danger portion of the dangerousness assessment as a tool for determining 
whether the court must increase the competency-rendering treatment period 
in felony cases. 
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One argument in favor of retaining the substantial-danger portion of the 
assessment is that it provides valuable information about the defendant’s 
potential impact on public safety.  If the court ultimately finds the defendant 
competent to stand trial, the assessment will undoubtedly have an impact on 
any ultimate resolution of the case.  Without that assessment, the 
prosecution, out of fear of harming public safety, is more likely to 
recommend a harsh sentence.  That will result in more cases going to trial 
that could have been resolved earlier, which in turn will backlog an already 
heavily backlogged criminal system. 
That argument is not persuasive.  Retaining the opinion as to whether the 
defendant should be referred for a civil commitment evaluation would 
provide similar information about any public-safety risks the defendant 
poses, but would do so without unduly burdening the mental health 
system.270  If implemented in conjunction with the other recommended 
improvements to the competency process described below,271 retaining the 
referral opinion would reduce unnecessary referrals to the civil commitment 
system, freeing up additional resources.272  In addition, felony sentences are 
governed by the SRA, which specifies sentencing guidelines based on the 
crime charged, the defendant’s criminal history, and other statutory factors.   
b)  Eliminate the Requirement of Two Evaluators 
Eliminating the requirement that there be at least two competency 
evaluators would increase the number of evaluations that could be 
completed without adding staff to Eastern State or Western State.  Under 
current law, the court must appoint a panel of at least two evaluators, at 
least one of whom must be approved by the prosecutor, unless the parties 
agree to rely on a single evaluator.273  The prosecutor’s approval right 
makes sense; the defendant may also obtain his or her own separate expert, 
at no cost to an indigent defendant.274  Because most, if not all, in-jail and 
other outpatient evaluations are conducted with a single evaluator, 
eliminating the second evaluator will only impact inpatient evaluations.  
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Although the number of inpatient evaluations is far smaller than the number 
of outpatient evaluations275—meaning the actual capacity added would be 
relatively small—adding some capacity is better than none at all.  For 
evaluations that are more complex, and therefore more difficult for a solo 
evaluator, Eastern State or Western State could still have the option to 
assign more than one evaluator. 
c)  Separate the Insanity and Diminished Capacity Portions of the 
Evaluation 
Although the competency report must include an insanity or diminished 
capacity opinion only if ordered by the court,276 it is still common for a 
jurisdiction to include insanity and diminished-capacity opinions as part of 
the evaluation, even if the defendant has given no indication that he or she 
intends to rely on either defense.277  The time required to conduct an 
unnecessary insanity and/or diminished capacity evaluation as part of the 
competency evaluation reduces the number of other competency evaluations 
that can be conducted.  While that may be more of a training issue, or an 
issue related to the particular forms a jurisdiction uses, separating out the 
insanity and diminished capacity evaluations would help avoid confusion 
and at least some inefficient use of time. 
2.  Integrate and Simplify the Competency-Rendering Process for 
Felonies and Nonfelonies 
The complexities in the competency-rendering process arise in large part 
from what is best described as a piecemeal approach to competency-
rendering treatment.  The result is an increased number of hearings, each of 
which requires that the defendant be transported to court from the treatment 
facility.  In many cases, the parties must present evidence so that the court 
can make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  By adopting a consistent 
approach to felony and nonfelony cases that considers the practical realities 
of competency-rendering treatment, the legislature can eliminate 
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unnecessary hearings, reduce interruptions in the treatment process, and 
focus scarce resources within the criminal justice and mental health systems 
where they should be focused—on treatment.  That means setting specific 
competency-rendering treatment periods—a longer one for serious felonies, 
a shorter one for non-serious felonies, one for serious nonfelonies that is 
tied to involuntary medication, and no treatment for non-serious 
nonfelonies.   
a)  Improving the Felony Process 
The current felony process is easy to apply: if the defendant is charged 
with a felony, then he or she must be ordered to undergo competency-
rendering treatment for ninety days, followed by an optional ninety-day 
period, potentially followed by another 180-day period.278  That process 
requires at least two additional hearings after the initial competency hearing 
and, with respect to the final 180-day period, at least some evidentiary 
hearing and findings of fact.  It also requires that the defendant’s treatment 
be interrupted each time he or she must attend a court hearing.  It is a given 
that treatment resources, whether for competency-rendering treatment or for 
civil commitment treatment, are limited—one cannot have one’s proverbial 
cake and eat it too.  That being said, the legislature can simplify the process 
and maximize the efficiency with which it utilizes the state’s limited 
treatment and criminal justice resources. 
This article recommends that the legislature adopt a two-tiered felony 
competency-rendering treatment period: a longer period for those charged 
with felonies defined as “serious” for purposes of the Sell opinion with 
respect to involuntary medication,279 such as 180 or 365 days; and a shorter 
period for those charged with “non-serious” felonies, such as sixty or ninety 
days.  The treatment facility should be authorized to return the defendant to 
court sooner if the facility concludes either that the defendant is rendered 
competent or is unlikely to be rendered competent within the remaining 
restoration period, just as it can under current law for nonfelonies.280  That 
260 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
PRISON AND DETENTION 
would eliminate using bed space for a defendant who either no longer needs 
it or will not respond to continued treatment.  The actual length of the 
periods must be related to the clinical likelihood of success rather than to 
budgetary concerns—the period must be long enough to provide a 
reasonable likelihood of success.  Setting an appropriate period will require 
input from the competency-rendering treatment providers. 
Society clearly has an interest in rendering competent those charged with 
serious felonies, but it also has an interest in rendering competent those 
charged with non-serious felonies.281  While a significant number of 
defendants can be rendered competent within a shorter period, such as sixty 
or ninety days, there will be many who require longer treatment.  A longer 
competency-rendering treatment period increases the likelihood those 
defendants will be rendered competent.  Why not, then, simply provide a 
longer treatment period for all defendants charged with a felony?  Because 
of limited resources.  There are simply not enough hospital beds and 
treatment staff to handle all of the restoration cases.  Clearly, adopting a 
lengthy restoration period for all felony defendants will not solve the 
problem. 
What about limiting competency-rendering treatment to those charged 
with serious felony crimes?  Society could focus its limited resources to 
those serious cases, and thus, could afford a longer restoration period.  The 
longer period, in turn, would increase the number of felony defendants 
rendered competent.  Using the definition of “serious” that is applicable to 
involuntary medication would eliminate one major element of the issue of 
involuntary medication and would still provide a bright-line definition for 
the courts to follow.  It would also leave the legislature the flexibility to 
define or re-define a “serious” offense in response to a changing society.282  
The trade-off is that it would leave an entire class of felony defendants 
ineligible for competency-rendering treatment.  One might argue that it is a 
waste of time to provide for restoration for a defendant charged with a non-
serious crime; competency-rendering treatment almost always involves 
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medication, and a defendant charged with a non-serious crime cannot be 
medicated involuntarily.283  But a shorter felony restoration period 
nevertheless lends itself to a wait and see approach in which the defendant 
is given an opportunity to take medication voluntarily.  If a defendant 
declines to take medication voluntarily, then the treatment facility would 
conclude that the defendant is unlikely to be restored and would return the 
defendant to court rather than have the defendant unnecessarily take up bed 
space. 
b)  Improving the Nonfelony Process 
Washington’s competency-rendering laws predate the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sell.  The result is parallel processes: one for 
determining whether a defendant is eligible for competency-rendering 
treatment, and one for determining whether the treatment facility is 
authorized to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication.  In the 
nonfelony arena, these parallel processes are so labyrinthine as to defy 
explanation.  The legislature has two options: refine the process so that it 
works in practice, or avoid the issue entirely by discontinuing the process.    
Because of public-safety concerns, the better option is to refine the process 
so that it works in practice by adopting a bright-line standard for 
competency-rendering treatment eligibility. 
A nonfelony competency-rendering process serves no purpose unless it 
provides a realistic opportunity to render competent a nonfelony defendant.  
Assuming a sufficient restoration period, the process must also account for 
the fact that most, but not all, nonfelony defendants will refuse to take 
medication voluntarily.  A defendant charged with a crime that is “serious” 
for Sell purposes is potentially eligible for court-authorized involuntary 
medication.  As a practical matter, that means only nonfelony defendants 
charged with a Sell-defined serious offense should be eligible for 
competency-rendering treatment.  While the court would still need to 
conduct hearings regarding the rest of the Sell criteria in those cases in 
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which the prosecution seeks authorization for the treatment facility to 
administer involuntary medication, those hearings would involve a single 
issue, and can often be handled, with the parties’ agreement, through 
telephonic testimony from the psychiatrist. 
Retaining the process does come with some costs.  The process requires 
sufficient resources and treatment time to provide a meaningful opportunity 
for restoration, including hospital bed space, hospital staff, and criminal 
justice resources for conducting eligibility hearings.  It will still require 
court hearings to determine a defendant’s restoration eligibility, but that 
could be combined with the competency hearing itself, and some defendants 
who could be restored will not be ordered into competency-rendering 
treatment based on their charges. 
Competency-rendering treatments for defendants charged with non-
serious nonfelony charges is a poor use of limited treatment resources.  
Because involuntary medication is not an option, the only defendants who 
stand a reasonable chance of being rendered competent are those who agree 
to take medication voluntarily.  But it makes little sense to set a 
competency-rendering treatment period long enough to adopt a wait-and-see 
approach to whether the defendant will agree to take medication. 
One could argue that the simplest nonfelony process is no nonfelony 
process.  However, the simplest solution is not always the best solution.  
The impetus for the Act was the lack of a nonfelony restoration process 
coupled with a gap in the civil commitment referral process.284  
Discontinuing the process transfers crime-related public-safety concerns 
from the criminal justice system to the mental health system, and transfers 
the associated mental health-related costs from the state mental health 
system to the local mental health system. 
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3.  Overlap with Civil Commitment System for Pre-Judgment 
Defendants 
At some point in the competency process, the criminal justice system 
intersects the mental health system.  The questions from society’s 
standpoint are how best to ensure public safety and who should be charged 
with that responsibility.  The current competency process sets out several 
methods for protecting public safety by referring defendants for civil 
commitment,285 but does not necessarily apportion that responsibility 
effectively. 
a)  Pre-Judgment Defendant Competent or Rendered Competent Following 
Treatment 
If the court finds the defendant competent based on the initial evaluation 
or following competency-rendering treatment, one could argue that a civil 
commitment referral is unnecessary.  Prior to resolution, the court can 
evaluate public-safety concerns just as it would in any other case, and 
impose appropriate conditions of release or continued release.  If the 
defendant is ultimately convicted, the court can impose mental health 
treatment as a condition of the sentence.  If the defendant is acquitted or the 
charges are dismissed and the competency evaluation does not recommend 
a civil commitment referral, it would be appropriate for the court to release 
the defendant outright.  The only circumstance that creates difficulty is if 
the defendant is acquitted, or the charges are dismissed, and the evaluation 
recommends a civil commitment referral.  Under current law, the court 
would be required to refer the defendant for evaluation, but there is really 
no mechanism to ensure that the evaluation can occur.286  One possible 
solution is to create statutory authority for the court to detain the defendant 
for some specific period following a dismissal for the DMHP to evaluate 
the defendant for civil commitment.  This is the current process for 
nonfelony defendants who are not competent to stand trial.287  The 
legislature should adopt a similar approach for competent defendants where 
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the competency evaluation recommends a referral.  It should adopt a time 
frame similar to that contained in the civil commitment statute: seventy-two 
hours, excluding weekends and holidays.288 
b)  Pre-Judgment Defendant Incompetent and Not Eligible for Competency-
Rendering Treatment or Treatment is Unsuccessful 
If the court finds the defendant incompetent and ineligible for 
competency-rendering treatment, or if the competency-rendering treatment 
does not render the defendant competent, one can make a strong argument 
that the mental health system should step in to protect public safety, and 
that the referral should be mandatory.  That argument certainly makes sense 
if the competency evaluation recommends a civil commitment referral.  The 
question becomes how best to carry out that referral.  Current law is silent 
on the process for referring an incompetent felony defendant for civil 
commitment evaluation.289  The nonfelony referral process, and whether the 
referral is to a state or county mental health professional, depends upon the 
defendant’s custody status and restoration eligibility.290  This multiplicity of 
referral avenues creates unnecessary confusion for both the criminal justice 
and mental health systems.  The simplest solution is to create a single 
referral process that applies to felony and nonfelony defendants.  The 
recommendation for competent defendants in the preceding section would 
work just as well for incompetent defendants. 
But what if the competency evaluator does not recommend a civil 
commitment referral?  The initial tragedy that led to the Act involved an 
incompetent nonfelony defendant who was not referred for civil 
commitment despite a recommendation that the referral be made.291  A 
mandatory referral makes sense if the competency evaluator recommends it, 
since the mental health system is making a mental health-related 
recommendation.  The referral makes no sense if the mental health system 
has already recommended against it, since it would burden the local mental 
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health system with second-guessing an assessment made by the state mental 
health system. 
4.  The Post-Judgment Process 
The current process for post-judgment cases is simple to describe—there 
is no process.  In addressing this issue, the legislature must first define 
“post-judgment” and then decide whether or not to provide a competency-
rendering process.  This article recommends that the legislature define 
“post-judgment” to reflect current practice—that the legislature does not 
provide a competency-rendering process, but that the legislature does 
provide a mechanism for monitoring post-judgment defendants.292 
a)  Defining “Post-Judgment” 
The practical reality is that sentencings, dispositional continuances, and 
deferred prosecutions all bear the characteristics of traditional post-
judgment matters—the case is essentially resolved, there will be no actual 
trial (and in the case of sentencings there may already have been a trial), 
and the defendant must face consequences.  The legislature should amend 
the competency statutes to reflect this reality by expressly defining 
“judgment.”  To avoid unforeseen consequences, i.e., impacting another 
statutory scheme in which the definition of “judgment” has other 
consequences, the legislature can limit the definition to RCW 10.77.  The 
time-for-trial period would not be at issue under the current rules.293 
b)  Monitoring the Defendant’s Situation Without a Restoration Process 
and Overlap with the Civil Commitment System 
A case does not end with the judgment; compliance with probation 
conditions constitutes an important part of the criminal justice process.  A 
defendant’s lack of competency at post-judgment compliance hearings 
blocks that important part of the process.  The seemingly quick and easy 
response would be to authorize competency-rendering treatment for all 
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incompetent defendants, whether at the pre- or post-judgment stage.  But 
that comes with a significant cost—hospital bed space allocated to 
competency-rendering treatment on post-judgment matters cannot be 
utilized for other purposes, such as competency-rendering treatment for pre-
judgment defendants and/or civil commitment matters.  On the other hand, 
not providing a competency-rendering process could threaten public safety, 
at least for some defendants, unless there is a process in place for the court 
to monitor the defendant’s situation. 
That system is already in place for defendants who are acquitted by 
reason of insanity; depending on the defendant’s dangerousness, the court 
either orders the defendant into inpatient treatment, into outpatient 
treatment, or releases the defendant outright.294  The court can require 
regular reports from the treatment provider and can revoke an outpatient 
treatment plan by ordering the defendant into outpatient treatment for 
violating the treatment plan.295  Because the nature of the treatment is based 
on the defendant’s dangerousness, public safety is protected.  As a failsafe, 
privacy laws should be amended to allow for the criminal justice system to 
receive information about the civil commitment status and to monitor the 
defendant if, and/or when, the civil commitment process ends.  The criminal 
court’s jurisdiction over the defendant under the current statutory scheme is 
the maximum period a defendant can be placed into some form of treatment 
within the criminal justice system, and is the maximum possible sentence he 
or she could have received upon conviction for any one of the charges.296 
That limitation should continue so that the defendant is not subjected to the 
court’s jurisdiction any longer than he or she would have been, absent the 
finding of incompetence.  If the defendant becomes competent, the court’s 
jurisdiction continues as it would in any other case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1998, the legislature responded to two highly publicized cases 
involving mentally ill offenders.  Its goals were straightforward: to increase 
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public safety and to increase communication between the criminal justice 
and mental health systems.297  The approach it took in overhauling the then-
existing system included new and bold steps, especially in the nonfelony 
arena.  The legislature’s efforts were necessary at the time, but we now have 
eight years of experience on which to reflect, and an increasing volume of 
cases that did not exist in 1998. 
 While the revamped laws adopted in 1998 went a long way towards the 
two-pronged goals stated above, the time is ripe to address the changes that 
have occurred since then.  This article has recommended a series of changes 
designed to create a better alignment between Washington’s criminal 
competency laws and the practical realities of today’s circumstances.  These 
recommendations include using limited resources more efficiently, adopting 
a competency-rendering process with specific treatment periods tied to the 
likelihood the defendant will be rendered competent, providing for a 
smoother interaction between the criminal competency process and the civil 
commitment system, and clarifying the process relating to post-judgment 
matters.  If we adopt these recommendations, we can move Washington’s 
criminal competency laws from where they are to where they should be. 
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the burden is on the defendant to establish that he or she is incompetent to stand trial, it is 
at least theoretically possible there may be cases in which the defendant asserts that he or 
she is competent to stand trial and the prosecution contends the defendant is incompetent. 
21  State v. Klein, 124 P.3d 644 (Wash. 2005). 
22  Ms. Klein petitioned for full release pursuant to WASH REV. CODE § 10.77.200(3).  
One issue in such a petition is whether the petitioner continues to suffer from a “mental 
disease or defect.”  See WASH REV. CODE § 10.77.200(3), 10.77.010(14) (2006); Klein, 
supra note 21, at 647-48. 
23  Klein, supra note 21, at 156 Wash. 2d at 649-53. 
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25  Id. 
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WASH. PRAC., HANDBOOK WASH. EVID. ER 702 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2006). 
27  State v. Klein, 124 P.3d 644, 649-51 (Wash. 2005). 
28  This cost has both monetary and social service aspects.  Increasing hospital bed space 
costs money, and that money cannot be spent on other social services for the mentally ill 
or for other members of society. 
29  Sometimes a defendant is subject to a simultaneous civil commitment, in which case 
the competency evaluation may take place at the civil commitment facility.  If a 
defendant is out of custody, the evaluation can occur at any location acceptable to the 
hospital, including the defense attorney’s office.  The focus on this section of the article 
is on the prototypical setting of an in-custody nonfelony defendant held in a jail.  If the 
court commits the defendant to a hospital or other suitable secure public or private mental 
health facility for the competency evaluation, then the court has discretion to delay 
granting bail until after the defendant has been evaluated and appears before the court.  
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(1)(b) (2006).  This provision applies equally to felony 
and nonfelony defendants.  As a practical matter, this discretion will have little impact in 
those courts of limited jurisdiction that have bail schedules.  If the court has adopted a 
bail schedule, then bail is established as soon as a defendant is booked on charges to 
which the bail schedule applies.  Section 10.77.060(1)(b) of the Revised Code of 
Washington  permits the court to delay granting bail, but does not mention revoking bail 
after it has already been set.  Thus, the effect of the option to delay the granting of bail in 
those jurisdictions is most likely limited to cases for which there is no bail schedule.  For 
example, in Seattle Municipal Court there is no bail schedule for domestic violence, 
harassment, stalking, and indecent exposure charges.  Section 10.77.060(1)(b)  is not 
expressly limited to pending cases, so it could arguably enable a court to delay granting 
bail in a sentencing or probation violation matter if the court had not previously set bail.  
But as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine a defendant who is in custody, without bail 
having already been set, facing sentencing or a probation violation.  The most likely 
reason a defendant facing sentencing or a probation violation would be in custody is 
because of a new pending charge (in which case, competency will be at issue on the new 
charge as well), an inability to post previously set bail, or a bench warrant (for which the 
court would have already set bail). 
30  § 10.77.060(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
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31  The fifteen day maximum period for the examination appears by the language of the 
statute to apply only to an inpatient examination at a mental health facility: the period 
begins to run from the date of “admission to the facility,” and makes no reference to the 
in-jail examination provision.  The legislature added the second sentence of the quoted 
material in 2004 further clouding the issue.  If one infers a  fifteen day limit for in-jail 
examinations, then of what effect is the “date of admission to the facility” language in 
terms of in-jail evaluations? 
32  See Department of Social & Health Services, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: 
FORENSIC COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND RESTORATION—STRATEGIES TO MINIMIZE 
WAITING PERIODS, 2 (2006) [hereinafter DHSH Report].  DSHS prepared ther report as 
directed by the legislature.  Id.; Chapter 504, Laws of 2005, Sec. 506(2). 
33  See DSHS Report supra note 32 at Charts 1, 3.  DSHS extrapolated Eastern State’s 
2005 statistics based on the first nine months of 2005.   Id. at Chart 3.  Western State’s 
2005 statistics are derived from a presentation given by Carl Redick, Psy.D with Western 
State Hospital at the District and Municipal Court Judges’ Association’s Spring 2006 
Conference, entitled A Mental Health Institution View, slide 12.  Western State’s 
database from which the statistics were gleaned is regularly updated and refined; the 
statistics apply as of the date of the conference on June 13, 2006.  All of the statistics 
presented in this article relate to adult defendants. 
34  Redick, supra note 33.  “Outpatient” refers to evaluations other than in the hospital.  
It includes evaluations in a jail facility as well as evaluations that occur in locations other 
than a secure facility. 
35  The number of in-jail evaluations began increasing at an alarming rate in 1998, 
following a recommendation from the MIO Task Force that competency evaluations for 
in-custody defendants occur in the jail if possible.  In 2005, the legislature amended § 
10.77.060 to expressly authorize the parties to agree that the evaluation should occur in 
the jail.  See Competency Examinations Act of 2004, supra note 13.   That amendment 
was directed primarily to evaluations by Eastern State.  Evaluations by Western State 
were, and continue to be, conducted primarily in jail, at least for nonfelony defendants. 
36  Redick, supra note 33, slide 51. 
37   § 10.77.060(1)(a). 
38  Redick, supra note 33, slide 51; DSHS Report, supra note 32, at 2.   
39  Cristi Rust, et al. v. W. State Hosp., et al., No. C00-5479RJB, United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington at Tacoma, originally issued September 28, 
2001 (“Rust Order”).  (The initial order is on file with the author.) 
40   See DSHS Report, supra note 32, at 4-5; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090 (2006) 
(competency); § 10.77.110 (insanity acquittals); § 71.05. 
41  For cases brought in district or superior court, the county prosecutor represents the 
state and therefore the county bears the jail costs for those prosecutions.  WASH. REV. 
CODE § 36.27.020(4) (2006); § 39.34.180(1) (2006).  For cases brought in municipal 
courts, which include courts in which the city contracts with the county for court services, 
the city bears responsibility for the prosecution and its attendant jail costs. § 3.46 (2006) 
(municipal departments within a district court); § 3.50 (2006) (municipal courts for cities 
with population under 400,000); ch. 35.20 (2006) (municipal courts for cities with 
population over 400,000, i.e., the City of Seattle);  § 39.34.180(1) (2006). for a detailed 
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discussion of the cost to the state of competency evaluations in various settings, see 
DSHS Report, supra note 32. 
42  A defendant whose mental illness has never been treated adequately may never have 
been competent to stand trial; the phrase “competency restoration” would be a misnomer 
for that defendant.  Accordingly, this article uses the phrase “competency-rendering” to 
encompass either bringing about or restoring a defendant’s competency. 
43  For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the defendant is not developmentally 
disabled.  The procedure for developmentally disabled defendants is somewhat different.  
See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090 (2006). 
44   § 10.77.090(1)(b). 
45   § 10.77.090(3).  
46  § 10.77.090(4). 
47  At this point in the proceedings the defendant has the right to a jury trial on the issue 
of his or her competency.  § 10.77.090(4). 
48  The evaluation must contain an opinion about dangerousness, WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.77.060(3)(f) (2006), but the judge or jury ultimately decides the issue. 
49  § 10.77.090(4). 
50   § 10.77.090(4). 
51  See § 10.77.090(1)(d), (e). 
52  Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098 (2005).  
53   § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(A). This includes insanity acquittals and incompetency dismissals 
under federal or non-Washington state statutes equivalent to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77. 
54  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(23) (2006).  
55  § 10.77.010(23).  The legislature added the definition of nonfatal injuries to abrogate 
Division One’s holding in Born.  See Born, 117 P.3d 1098. 
56  § 10.77.010(13).  There are slightly different definitions of “violent act” and “history 
of one or more violent acts” under section 71.05 of the Revised Code of Washington.  See 
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(18), (36) (2006).  
57  Some may argue that creating a presumption against the defendant violates the 
general constitutional due process principle that the burden of proof may never be shifted 
to the defendant in a criminal case.  But keep in mind that the “process” involved in 
determining eligibility for competency-rendering treatment is statutorily created, not 
constitutionally created.  There is no process provided at all for a defendant charged with 
a felony who is incompetent. Section 10.77.090(1)(b) automatically requires 90 days of 
competency-rendering treatment.  In any event, this is an issue that is best left to the 
parties to brief and the courts to resolve. 
58  As defined in the Criminal Records Privacy Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1) 
(2006). 
59  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.085 (2006).  In Born, the parties stipulated to the 
facts in the police report so the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the 
report would have been admissible without the parties’ agreement.  Born v. Thompson, 
117 P.3d 1098, 1099 (2005). 
60  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
61  The “Crawford issue” refers to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses.  See id. 
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62  Since the defendant is not competent to stand trial, the defense would have a difficult 
time convincing the judge that the defendant could testify competently at the hearing.  
The defense would also have to grapple with the issue of the defendant’s right not to 
testify and right not to incriminate himself or herself. 
63  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(23)(b) (2006).  
64  Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098, 1101 (2005). 
65  Id. at 753-60. 
66  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(b) (2006).  The argument is that the question is one 
of statutory due process rather than constitutional due process.  That process is a rather 
complex issue and is beyond the scope of this article. 
67  § 10.97.30(1). 
68  § 10.77.040; § 10.77.080. 
69   § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C).  
70  Of course, a court can order Western State or Eastern State to provide outpatient 
competency-rendering treatment, in which case the hospital involved would be required 
to create such a program. 
71  This list is not intended to be exhaustive. 
72  This assumes that the defendant waives his or her privacy rights to allow defense 
counsel to provide proof to the court of the defendant’s participation and progress in the 
Less Restrictive Order (LRO) program. 
73  An LRO means that the civil commitment court has ordered that the subject receive 
outpatient treatment in the community.  A More Restrictive Order (MRO) means that the 
civil commitment court has ordered that the subject receive inpatient treatment at Eastern 
State or Western State. 
74  This list is not intended to be exhaustive. 
75    WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iv) (2006).  See infra notes 93-113 and 
accompanying text. 
76  Defined in § 10.77.010(17). 
77    § 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii). 
78  See infra notes  183-88  and accompanying text. 
79    § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(I) (emphasis added). 
80   § 10.77.060(1)(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
81  The final version of the Bill as passed deleted the time limitation on in-jail 
evaluations.  Prior versions of the legislation contained an express fifteen day limit on in-
jail evaluations as well.  Compare S.B. 5216, 58th Leg. §2(1)(a), Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2003) with  S.B. 5216, 58th Leg. §1, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004). 
82  Weiss v. Thompson, 85 P.3d 944 (Wash. 2004). 
83  See also Competency Examinations Act of 2004, supra note 13 at §1. The statement 
of legislative intent expressly distinguishes between competency evaluations in a jail 
from competency evaluations in a mental health facility. 
84  Weiss, supra note 82, at 947–48. 
85   Weiss v. Thompson, 103 P.3d 202 (Wash. 2004) (Table). 
86   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C), (iii)(B) (2006).  
87   See § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(II) (2006).  
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88  Although the author is not aware of any outpatient competency-rendering programs, 
Western State has advised the author that it would make such treatment available if 
ordered.  In that regard, staff have indicated to the author that Western State’s 
competency evaluator will recommend outpatient competency-rendering treatment if the 
competency evaluator deems it appropriate. 
89  See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. 
90   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(III) (2006). 
91  Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
92  See infra notes 129-82 and accompanying text. 
93  Although § 10.77.090(1)(d) and (e) do not specify whether dismissal of a nonfelony 
should be with or without prejudice, § 10.77.090(4) provides that dismissal of a felony is 
without prejudice.  There is no logical reason to dismiss a felony without prejudice while 
allowing the dismissal of a nonfelony with prejudice, especially in light of the fact that 
the legislature amended WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77 in 1998 to treat competency and 
insanity issues in felony and nonfelony cases more similarly. 
94  See § 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii)-(iv).  
95  § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B). 
96  § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B). 
97  The phrase “the end of the last day” implies that the deadline would be midnight on 
Thursday, which is the actual end of the day, rather than five o’clock, which would be the 
end of the business day. 
98   § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iv).  
99  This cost-allocation issue is something that should be handled on a larger scale that 
considers all of the other issues.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
100  Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.250 (2006) with WASH. REV. CODE § 
71.05.100–.130 (2006). 
101  Every county must have a DMHP, who initiates the civil commitment process under 
section 71.05 of the Revised Code of Washington when the statutory requirements are 
met.  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(10) (2006).  Prior to July 1, 2005, the statutory 
phrase was “County Designated Mental Health Professional,” or CDMHP.  The 
legislature changed the phrase to reflect that the mental health professional could be 
designated by either a county or any other “authority authorized in rule.”  § 
71.05.020(10) (2006).  In some counties, such as King County, the DMHP is actually a 
group of mental health professionals who are employed directly by the county.  In other 
counties, the DMHP is a mental health professional (or group of them) providing services 
to the county on a contract basis. 
102  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A); § 71.05.235(1) (2006). 
103   § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii), (iv).  
104  § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B). 
105   § 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A).  
106   There is a difference between being on “conditional release” and being out of 
custody.  A “conditional release” means a modification of a court-ordered commitment. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(3).  “Commitment” is a court-ordered detention for 
evaluation or treatment, whether inpatient or outpatient.  § 10.77.010(2).  Thus, a 
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defendant may under some circumstances be out of custody without being on a 
conditional release, such as a release on personal recognizance. 
107   See § 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A); § 71.05.235(1). 
108  See Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(b).  A Personal Restraint Petition is a petition for relief 
from an unlawful restraint.  Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(a).  A person is under a restraint if he 
or she “has limited freedom because of a court decision in a civil or criminal proceeding, 
[he or she] is confined, [he or she] is subject to imminent confinement, or [he or she] is 
under some other disability resulting from a judgment or sentence in a criminal case.”  
Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(b). 
109   See § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B); § 71.05.235(2). 
110    See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(3)(f) (2006). 
111    WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065(1)(b)(iii)(B) (2006).  See infra notes 183–88 and 
accompanying text.  
112   See § 10.77.090(1)(e).  See also infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. 
113   There is support for this interpretation in the first sentence of WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.77.090(1)(e), which applies to a defendant charged with a crime that is not a felony 
and “does not meet the criteria under [§ 10.77.090(1)(d)].”  Given the context of the 
language, the reference to treatment-eligible was probably intended to mean specifically 
the treatment-eligible criteria under § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i).  But the language quoted above 
at least supports an interpretation that § 10.77.090(1)(e) applies to any case that does not 
fit within any provision of § 10.77.090(1)(d).  Because an incompetent treatment-eligible 
nonfelony defendant who is unlikely to regain competency does not fit within the criteria 
of § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii), one could make the argument that § 10.77.090(1)(e) applies by 
default. 
114    This period excludes weekends and holidays.  § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B); § 
71.05.235(2). 
115    § 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A); § 71.05.235(1). 
116   See § 10.77.090(1)(e). 
117    See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
118    These examples presume that Defendants A, B, and C are not developmentally 
disabled; there are some differences in how the competency treatment can be ordered in 
the case of a developmentally disabled felony defendant.  The examples do not consider 
the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065 (2006), which requires the court to 
order the DMHP to evaluate a defendant for civil commitment if the competency 
evaluation contains the opinion that the defendant should be referred for a civil 
commitment evaluation.  See infra notes 183–88 and accompanying text. 
119    WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(b) (2006). 
120   § 10.77.090(3). 
121    The court can extend the involuntary treatment another six months if the defendant is 
a substantial danger to other persons or presents a substantial likelihood of committing 
criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security, and there is a substantial probability 
that the defendant will regain competency within a reasonable period of time.  § 
10.77.090(4).  See also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
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122   See § 10.77.090(3), (4).  The option of releasing the defendant is subject to any 
applicable requirements in § 10.77.065(1)(b).  See infra notes 183–88 and accompanying 
text. 
123    WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(e) (2006).  
124    See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
125    § 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii).  
126    § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C).  See also supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
127     § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C). 
128     See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text. 
129    See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, NAT’L. INST. OF HEALTH, 
SCHIZOPHRENIA, NIH PUBLICATION NO. 06-3517 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, NATI’L INST. OF HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER, NIH PUBLICATION 
NO. 02-3679 (2006). 
130     See id. 
131     Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
132     Id. at 170.  
133     Id. at 171. 
134     Id. at 175. 
135     Id. at 169. 
136     Id. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, first analyzed the issue of whether the 
Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  The Court found that the District 
Court’s pretrial order was an appealable “collateral order” within the exceptions to the 
so-called “final judgment” rule.  Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia focused entirely 
on the jurisdictional issue.  See Id. 
137    Id. at 186. 
138    Id. 
139    Id. at 168. 
140    Id. at 174. 
141  See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (discussing of subsequent cases 
attempting to define a “serious” crime for purposes of involuntary medication). 
142    See id. 
143    United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237-38 (4th Cir. 2005). 
144    See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
145   WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 21-22; State v. Browet, Inc., 691 P.2d 691 (Ariz. 1984); 
Pasco v. Mace, 653 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1982). 
146    Evans, 404 F.3d at 237 (citations omitted). 
147   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.092 (2006). 
148   § 10.77.092(1).  Interestingly, prior drafts of the enacting legislation gave city and 
county legislatures the authority to declare additional categories of crimes as serious per 
se on the basis of standards similar to those applicable to the courts.  See S.B. 6274, 58th 
Leg. §3, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004) (proposed subsection 3).  That authority did not survive 
in the final version of the bill as enacted.  See Competency Restoration Act, 2004 Wash. 
Sess. Laws page no. 555, ch. 157 (amending WASH REV. CODE §§ 10.77, 71.05). 
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149    § 10.77.092(2).  One interesting question is whether this delegation to the courts by 
the legislature flies in the face of the Evans court’s desire to respect legislative 
prerogative. 
150   See S.B. 6274, supra note 148. 
151   Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-80 (2003). 
152    United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 
1128 (2005). 
153    State v. Hernandez, 119 P.3d 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).  
154    Id. (using phrase “clear, cogent, and convincing”).  The phrases “clear, cogent, and 
convincing” and “clear and convincing” are used interchangeablely.  For example, the 
supreme court has held that the equivalent standard of clear and convincing evidence 
applies whether a nonfelony defendant is in the treatment-eligible or non-treatment-
eligible category.  See Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098 (Wash. 2003). 
155   There is one Ninth Circuit case that came close to addressing the issue.  In United 
States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2004), a federal magistrate judge 
found that the government had provided clear and convincing evidence that all the factors 
for involuntary medication to restore competency had been met.  The Ninth Circuit held 
that federal magistrate judges were not authorized to decide whether to authorize 
involuntary medication for competency-rendering treatment, and the court remanded the 
case so that the district court could review the magistrate judge’s findings de novo.  Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit did not actually reach the issue of what the burden of proof is for 
involuntary medication. 
156    Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-80 (2003). 
157   Id.  In State v. Adams, 888 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) and State v. 
Lover, 707 P.2d 1351, 1353-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985), the Court of Appeals held that the 
state can have a compelling interest in trying a defendant criminally.  The charges in 
those two cases were felonies.  After Sell, it appears that the trial court still must make an 
independent inquiry into the nature of the charges and circumstances in order to make a 
finding that the government has an important interest at stake in trying a particular 
defendant. 
158   Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
159   Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2006). 
160   There are some misdemeanors that carry a maximum jail sentence of less than ninety 
days.  See, e.g., SEATTLE MUN. CODE, § 22.206.290(B) (2001) (thirty-day maximum). 
161  See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(1)(b) (2006) (Superior Court has jurisdiction over 
petition); § 71.05.130 (County Prosecutor or Attorney General’s Office represent 
petitioning agencies). 
162  WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.390 (2006). 
163   Competency Restoration Act of 2004, supra note 148, at §§ 4-5. 
164   § 71.05.390(6)(b). 
165  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.093 (2006).  This may pose some interesting issues if 
defense counsel’s knowledge is deemed to be either a client confidence or a client secret 
on the basis of RPC 1.6.  See State v. Webbe, 94 P.3d 994 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).  In 
Webbe, one of the defense attorneys sought to testify at a jury trial on the issue of the 
defendant’s competency.  The attorney’s statement of his intent to testify about his 
impressions of the defendant’s competency led to the trial court finding a waiver of the 
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attorney-client privilege.  The attorney later decided not to testify, and prosecutors 
returned their unredacted copy of the defense attorney’s interview notes to the defendant.  
After a hung jury in the first competency trial, a second jury found the defendant 
competent.  The defendant was subsequently convicted of multiple counts of murder and 
burglary.  Division One upheld the trial court’s finding that the defense attorney had 
waived the attorney-client privilege, even though it was made without the defendant’s 
consent.  Division One also affirmed the convictions, finding that under the 
circumstances the “grievous error” did not result in a breakdown in the adversarial 
process such that prejudice should be presumed.  Since the defendant did not allege any 
prejudice, Division One declined to find any either. 
166   Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (emphasis added). 
167   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C) (2006). 
168   See § 10.77.090(1)(b)(3), (4).  
169    The issue of mitigating side effects is one that is also susceptible to vigorous 
litigation.  It would not be surprising to see an increase in the number of defense experts 
appointed pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.070 (2006), specifically on this issue. 
170   See, e.g., United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317, 319-20 (8th Cir. 2004) (5-10 percent 
chance not “substantially likely”); United State v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 161-62 (Conn. 
2004) (70 percent chance is “substantially likely”); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 
873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001) (pre-Sell case holding 70 
percent chance is “likely” to restore); United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 
(E.D. LA 2005) (70 percent chance or higher is “substantially likely”). 
171   See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.  
172   Washington v. Hernandez-Ramirez, 119 P.3d 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
173   See, e.g., Evans, 404 F.3d at 240-41; Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
174   See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113-16 (10th Cir. 2005); Gomes, 
387 F.3d at 161-62. 
175   Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003). 
176   Id.   
177   See also supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
178   Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003). 
179   The author has handled a case involving similar facts. 
180   See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
181   Sell, 539 U.S. at 178, 181. 
182   WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.030 (2006). 
183   The evaluation must include:  
 
An opinion as to whether the defendant should be evaluated by a [DMHP] under 
chapter 71.05 RCW, and an opinion as to whether the defendant is a substantial 
danger to other persons, or presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal 
acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept under further control by the 
court or other persons or institutions. 
 
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(3)(f) (2006). 
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184   This process is codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065, (2006). 
185   The language of section 10.77.065(1)(b) includes a referral prior to a defendant’s 
release from confinement if he or she is convicted and sentenced to less than twenty-four 
months.  A defendant may not proceed to trial, plead guilty, or be sentenced while 
incompetent.  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.050 (2006). 
186   See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
187   For example, the referral must be made prior to the defendant’s release from custody 
if the defendant is convicted and sentenced to twenty-four months or less of confinement.  
§ 10.77.065(1)(b).  But the statute is silent about what happens if the defendant is 
convicted but not sentenced to jail time.  For defendants who are not convicted, the 
referral must be made prior to charges being dismissed or the defendant being acquitted.  
Id.  But there is no way for the court to know in advance that one of those events will 
happen and therefore no way to make the referral in advance. 
188   See infra notes 285-91 and accompanying text. 
189   This assumes either a guilty finding, a guilty verdict, or some other resolution of the 
case involving a court-monitored sanction.  If the defendant is acquitted, or the case is 
dismissed, the case is at the post-judgment stage but competency issues are no longer 
implicated. 
190   See WASH. R. APP. P. 1.1(a); Karl B. Tegland, 2A Rules Practice, 44-45 (6th ed. 
2004). 
191   Tegland, supra note 190, at 82. 
192   Karl B. Tegland, 4B Rules Practice, 189 (6th ed. 2002) (emphasis added). 
193   WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.3 (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.3 
(nonfelonies). 
194   WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.4(b) (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.4(b) 
(nonfelonies). 
195   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.090(1) (2006). 
196    § 10.77.050. 
197   See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.505, 
9.94A.634 (2006) (imposition of sentence and probation; no provision for deferral of 
sentence). 
198   See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.330 (2006) (applicable to municipal courts for cities 
with population less than 400,000); WASH. REV. CODE § 3.66.068 (2006) (applicable to 
district courts); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.20.255(1) (2006) (applicable to municipal courts 
for cities with population in excess of 400,000, i.e., Seattle Municipal Court). 
199   The court could impose a straight sentence, such as a specific fine or specific amount 
of incarceration without any probation conditions.  There are no post-judgment 
competency issues with a straight sentence because a straight sentence does not contain 
any probation conditions and therefore cannot be the subject of a probation revocation 
hearing. 
200   WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.3 (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.3 
(nonfelonies). 
201   See § 3.50.330 (municipal courts for cities with population less than 400,000); § 
3.66.068 (district courts); § 35.20.255(1) (municipal courts for cities with population in 
excess of 400,000, i.e., Seattle Municipal Court). 
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202  It should be noted that a dismissal following successful completion of a deferred 
sentence is still considered a “conviction record” for purposes of the Criminal Records 
Privacy Act.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(3)-(4) (2006). 
203   State v. Proctor, 415 P.2d 634, 646 (Wash. 1966). 
204   Sometimes referred to as stipulated orders of continuance or continuances for 
dismissal. 
205   Indeed, a petition for deferred prosecution must acknowledge the sufficiency of the 
police report to support a finding of guilt.  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.020(4) (2006). 
206   See King County Bar Association—Young Lawyers Division, Washington Lawyers 
Practice Manual, ch. XVII, Pt. 2, sec. V.D.4 (2004). 
207   § 10.05.020(1). 
208   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.120 (2006). 
209  § 10.05.020(3); § 10.05.090. If the noncompliance is based on a conviction for “a 
similar offense,” the court “shall” revoke the deferred prosecution.  § 10.05.100. 
210   State ex rel. Schillberg v. Cascade Dist. Court, 621 P.2d 115, 120 (Wash. 1980). 
211   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(1)(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  Even if that section 
did not apply to a post-conviction matter, superior courts in Washington likely have 
inherent judicial powers to make determinations regarding competency to stand trial.  See 
State v. Wicklund, 638 P.2d 1241 (Wash. 1982) (noting that courts relied exclusively on 
that inherent power prior to the adoption of § 10.77).  Whether that inherent authority 
extends to district or municipal courts is best left for the parties to brief in a particular 
case.   
212   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.050 (2006) (emphasis added). 
213    State v. Campbell, 632 P.2d 517 (Wash. 1981) (felony probation).  See also Spokane 
v. Marquette, 43 P.3d 502 (Wash. 2002) (applying Campbell in context of tolling 
nonfelony probation). 
214  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)-(4) (2006).  See State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60 
(Wash. 1990) (felony case). 
215   See Wicklund, 638 P.2d at 1242 (including cases cited therein). 
216   Campbell, 632 P.2d at 519 
217   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)-(4) (2006).  See also supra notes 44-51, 93-128 
and accompanying text. 
218   See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text. 
219   WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.3 (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.3 
(nonfelonies). 
220   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.050 (2006). 
221    See notes 44-51, 93-102, 116-17. 
222    See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
223   See Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.94A (2006) (felonies); 
§ 3.50.320 (2006), § 3.50.330 (municipal courts for cities with population of under 
400,000); §§ 3.66.067–.068 (district courts); § 35.20.255 (municipal courts for cities with 
population in excess of 400,000). 
224   If the defendant was competent to proceed on the new charge, he or she would 
undoubtedly be competent to proceed with sentencing on the old charge.  If the defendant 
was incompetent to proceed, but was eligible for competency-rendering treatment on the 
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new charge, it is possible he or she could be rendered competent on both the sentencing 
matter and the new charge. 
225   See generally State v. Marshall, 27 P.3d 192 (Wash. 2001). 
226   Id. at 193-94. 
227   Id. at 194-95. 
228   Id. at 199 (citing In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610 (Wash. 2001)).   
229   Id. at 200. 
230  See, e.g., United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987) (meaningful 
retrospective competency hearing requires quantity and quality of available evidence 
such that competency assessment is more than mere speculation). 
231   Id. 
232   State v. Campbell, 632 P.2d 517 (1981). 
233   WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92 (2006), which has since been supplanted by the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1981; § 9.94A. 
234   Campbell, 632 P.2d at 518.   
235   Id. 
236   Spokane v. Marquette, 43 P.3d 502 (Wash. 2002). 
237   Id. at 505 - 506. 
238   Id. at 505. 
239   See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.350.320 (2006); § 3.350.330 (municipal courts for cities 
with population of 400,000 and under); §§ 3.66.067-.068 (district courts); § 35.20.255 
(municipal courts for cities with population in excess of 400,000). 
240   See WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 3.3(c)(2)(ii); WASH. CRIM. LTD. JURIS. 3.3(c)(2)(ii). 
241   See WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 3.3(e)(1) (applicable to felonies); WASH. CRIM. LTD. JURIS. 
3.3 (e)(1) (nonfelonies). 
242   WASH. CT. CRIM R. 3.3(E)(1). 
243   Id. 
244   See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
245   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.020(4) (2006). 
246   § 10.05.110. 
247   State v. Campbell, 632 P.2d 517, 518 (Wash. 1981). 
248   See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. 
249   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.140 (2006). 
250   But if the court cannot revoke probation, and if the defendant nevertheless remains 
on probation, what happens to the duties and responsibilities of the probation officer?  
Case law has expanded the liability of probation officers when their probationers commit 
tortious acts.  See, e.g., Hertog v. City of Seattle, 979 P.2d 400 (Wash. 1999).  Absent 
statutory guidance, probation officers face potential liability for negligent supervision 
even though they have no ability to bring about sanctions for noncompliance. 
251   Obviously, if the court finds the defendant competent, or if the court orders 
competency-rendering treatment and the treatment restores the defendant to competency, 
the court will not need to deal immediately with the issue of referring the defendant for a 
civil commitment evaluation. 
252   “The court shall order an evaluation . . . (i) Prior to release from confinement for 
such person who is convicted, if sentenced to confinement for twenty-four months or 
          Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 281 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
 
less; (ii) for any person who is acquitted; or (iii) for any person whose [felony] charges 
are dismissed pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(4) or (B) (2006) whose 
nonfelony charges are dismissed.”  § 10.77.065(1)(b).  See supra notes 183–88 and 
accompanying text for further detail.  None of these three conditions relate to a person 
awaiting sentencing or a probation violation hearing. 
253   See § 10.77.090(1)(d), (1)(e).  Although § 10.77.090(4) contemplates initiating civil 
commitment proceedings against an incompetent felony defendant, it does not expressly 
authorize the court to detain the defendant for that purpose. 
254  Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05 with § 10.77.090(1)(d)-(e) (2006). 
255   In the Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Act of 1998, which amended both the 
competency and civil commitment laws, the legislature took care to recognize that 
incompetence to stand criminal trial did not equate to eligibility for civil commitment.  
Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Act of 1998, supra note 4, at §1 (statement of 
legislative intent). 
256   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(14) (2006).  See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 
10.77.   
257   WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(22) (2006). See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 
71.05.  
258   State v. Klein, 124 P.3d 644, 650 (Wash. 2005).  The court noted that, according to 
the dictionary, “mental disease or defect” has the common meaning of “mental disorder” 
(citing Webster’s third new International Dictionary 1411 (2002)).  What is extraordinary 
is that the opinion ignores the statutory definition of “mental disorder” contained in § 
71.05.020(22). 
259   A “mental disorder” is defined as “any organic, mental, or emotional impairment 
which has substantial adverse effects on an individual’s cognitive or volitional 
functions.”  § 71.05.020(22). 
260  See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. 
261   See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. 
262   See supra notes 42-182 and accompanying text. 
263   Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(3) (2006) with Laws 1974, Ex. Sess, ch. 
198, § 6; Laws 1989, ch. 420, § 4; Laws 1998, ch. 297, § 34; and Laws 2000, ch. 74, § 1.  
Pursuant to § 10.77.060(3), a competency report must include: 
 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant; 
(c) If the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, or is developmentally 
disabled, an opinion as to competency; 
(d) If the defendant has indicated his or her intention to rely on the defense of 
insanity pursuant to RCW 10.77.030, an opinion as to the defendant’s sanity at the 
time of the act; 
(e) When directed by the court, an opinion as to the capacity of the defendant to have 
a particular state of mind which is an element of the offense charged; 
(f) An opinion as to whether the defendant should be evaluated by a designated 
mental health professional under chapter 71.05 RCW, and an opinion as to whether 
the defendant is a substantial danger to other persons, or presents a substantial 
282 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
PRISON AND DETENTION 
 
likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless 




264   § 10.77.060(3)(f). 
265   The statute defines the “substantial danger” assessment as “whether the defendant is 
a substantial danger to other persons, or presents a substantial likelihood of committing 
criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept under further control by 
the court or other persons or institutions.”  § 10.77.060(3)(f). 
266   See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(4).  See also supra notes 44-51 and 
accompanying text. 
267   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065 (2006).  See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying 
text.  One would logically assume that the mandatory referral is triggered by the opinion 
as to whether the defendant should be evaluated for civil commitment, yet § 10.77.065 
speaks in general terms about the opinion “under RCW 10.77.060(3)(f)” that the 
defendant “should be kept under further control.” 
268   In felony cases, competency evaluations can occur at three different stages.  There is 
the initial evaluation (§ 10.77.060(1)(a)), the evaluation at the end of the first 90-day 
competency-rendering treatment period, and the evaluation at the end of the second 90-
day treatment period.  See § 10.77.060(1); § 10.77.090(2)-(4).  Under current law, each 
evaluation is required to contain a dangerousness assessment.  
269   See infra notes 278-83 and accompanying text. 
270   An assessment of a defendant’s future dangerousness or future criminal behavior is 
far more involved than an assessment of a defendant’s suitability for civil commitment 
evaluation.  Compare Polly Phipps & Gregg J. Gagliardi, WASH. STATE INSTITUTE FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION OF WASHINGTON’S DANGEROUS MENTALLY ILL 
OFFENDER LAW: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS app. C (assessment for potential civil 
commitment) with app. A (risk assessment for future dangerousness/criminal behavior) 
(2002).  See also Martin Grann, Henrik Belfrage, & Anders Tengstrom, Actuarial 
Assessment of Risk for Violence: Predictive Validity of the VRAG and the Historical Part 
of the HCR-20, 27 Criminal Justice & Behavior 97 (2000). 
271   See infra notes 278-91 and accompanying text. 
272   Without the civil commitment opinion, judges could not easily determine which 
defendants should be referred for civil commitment evaluation.  The result is that courts 
will most likely err on the side of caution by referring defendants for civil commitment 
evaluation.  Since those referrals would for the most part be made to the local DMHP 
rather than Eastern or Western State (see §§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(A), (1)(e); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 71.05.130), the DMHP would soon find itself inundated with inappropriate 
referrals, depleting already scarce resources. 
273   § 10.77.060(1)(a) (2006).  In 2005, the legislature amended the statute to expressly 
authorize the parties to agree to waive the requirement of two competency examiners or 
to agree that the evaluation should occur in the jail.  See Competency Examinations Act 
of 2004, supra note 13, at § 1(9).  
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274   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.070 (2006).  If the defendant is indigent, the state pays for 
the expert.  Id.  See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-875-0030 (2006). 
275  See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. 
276   § 10.77.060(3)(d), (e) (2006). 
277   Redick, supra note 33. 
278   See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text. 
279   See supra notes 129-79 and accompanying text. 
280   See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii) (2006).  
281   See State v. Adams, 888 P.2d 1207-08 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Lover, 707 
P.2d 1351, 1352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
282   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.092 (2006) defines serious offenses for purposes of the 
involuntary medication and competency-rendering processes. 
283   See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text. 
284   See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
285   See supra notes 50-51, 93-117 and accompanying text. 
286   See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065 (2006).  See also supra notes 183–88 and 
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion. 
287   WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(e) (2006).  
288   See § 71.05.150; § 71.05.280. 
289    See § 10.77.090(4). 
290   See § 10.77.090(1)(d), (e). See also supra notes 93-128 and accompanying text for a 
more detailed discussion. 
291   See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.  The statute in effect at the time made 
the referral discretionary.  See former WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(e) (1999). 
292   For this purpose, “post-judgment” includes dispositional continuances, deferred 
prosecutions, and other similar dispositions short of trial.  See supra notes 204-10 and 
accompanying text. 
293   See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
294  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.040 (2006); § 10.77.080; 10.77.110. 
295   See § 10.77.160–.190. 
296    § 10.77.025(1).  The length of treatment under a competency process must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the purpose of the treatment.  Jackson, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
297   See Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Act of 1998, supra note 4, at §1.   
 
